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On surface, Niger and Mali share fairly similar territorial configura-
tions and historical trajectories. Recurring rebellions supported by mainly 
nomadic groups raise the question of relations between the centre and 
peripheries in these states. The purpose of this study is to analyse how 
these states try “peacemaking”, in the absence of “peacebuilding”, resul-
ting in short-term hybrid arrangements that are cobbled together. The 
study integrates ways to make peace and wage war within a common ana-
lytical context. However, it is structured around an analysis of the forms of 
violent mobilisation followed by that of state actions. 
FactorS and reSourceS oF violent collective dynamicS
We consider the rebellion as the progressive (and not necessarily 
planned, nor linear) pooling of various types of resources, which tempora-
rily gives rise to a violent political mobilisation. The result is rebellions with 
multiple motivations or even identities for which a simple answer may not 
be sufficient. We examine three types of structuring resources. 
- The first resource is ideological. The ideological repertoire, which 
encourages the rebellion, includes world views, a sense of justice, or 
important normative principles. 
The protester-separatist repertoire is the most evident among those 
voiced by successive rebellions. This explicit ideological mobilisation 
(which is opportunely combined with ecological and anti-terrorist argu-
ments, as shown by the respective examples of the MNJ - Niger Movement 
for Justice - in Niger and the MNLA - National Movement for the Liberation 
of Azawad - in Mali) is essential for the group to be taken seriously locally, 
nationally, and internationally, but may simultaneously conceal other 
logics of mobilisation. This co-existence of different logics even within a 
rebel group which is homogeneous and united in its demands can explain 
the difficulties that states have in responding to it. 
At a less publicly asserted level, the figure of the rebel or former rebel 
also remains highly valued in some segments of these nomadic societies, 
as well as with their foreign partners. This figure is also moulded according 
to the evolution of the cycles of rebellion and their contents. New protest 
figures emerge. On the one hand, the rise of the grey economy promotes 
the figure of the “social bandit.” On the other hand, the spread of aggres-
sive political Islam valorises the figure of the pious rebel. 
- The second mobilisation factor refers to external dynamics. 
The first of these dynamics corresponds to regional (Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco) or international (France) diplomatic interference 
in Sahelian political changes. These peripheral powers can promote rebel 
dynamics or take advantage of them to push their agenda at the expense 
of their neighbours. Jihadist interference can be added to diplomatic inter-
ference – originally foreign since AQMI (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) 
historically came from Algeria – but which is now being endogenized with 
a specifically Sahelian jihad. It seems that some of the causes that have 
motivated the separatist mobilisation – injustice, the opportunity of social 
reclassification by protest, rejection of the state – are among the main 
causes for involvement with jihadist groups, to such an extent that it is no 
longer possible to think of the rebellion in Mali in isolation from terrorist 
groups. 
The other external factor is the influence of commercial economic 
resources (control of cross-border traffic) not only on the outbreak, but 
also on the continuity of the rebellion. Trafficking interests are the main 
source of rebel funding. They deteriorate inter-community relations and 
fragment the armed groups. Far from being the prerogative of the rebels, 
trafficking is subject to competition with actors linked to the state. This 
complexifies the search for peace. 
- A third factor, which partly depends on the previous two, corres-
ponds to the extent of the social base the rebellion has. The individual 
decision to engage in or support a rebellion is often a personal choice, 
without planning or clear direction. However, the extent of the base lar-
gely depends on the actual community inclusiveness of the armed group 
making the demand. Historically, rebellions originate from inter-commu-
nity alliances or communities in isolation.
These three categories of resources combine to provide a broad spec-
trum of rebel dynamics. State strategies developed to deal with them 
are a reflection of this. Because the factors shaping rebellions evolve and 
increasingly involve distant influences, the solutions traditionally thought 
up by states to respond to the autonomous motivations of the armed 
groups are no longer enough. Thus, for the 2012 rebellion in Mali, the figh-
ters’ motivations largely originated from geopolitical upheavals, commu-
nity rivalries, settling of personal scores, drug-trafficking interests, and the 
presence of AQMI in northern Mali. These motivations – are inconsistent 
with the catalogue of measures usually proposed for “peacemaking” – 
requiring a rethink of traditional peace engineering. 
Peacemaking in mali and niger
The recurring rebellions since 1963 in Mali and since 1991 in Niger are 
largely explained by the fact that the peace processes in the Sahel are 
much more about peacemaking than peacebuilding. The states of Mali 
and Niger have used seemingly similar procedures for “peacemaking”, 
although Niger appears much more advanced through an integrated poli-
tical framework and an innovative tension control and conflict prevention 
tool: the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP). 
- Political integration. Beyond significant structural differences with 
Mali, which have historically promoted North-South interaction in Niger, 
this country has a less polarising and more integrating political life which 
maintains the social peace. Often summarised as the simple co-optation 
of former rebels, the Nigerien integration system goes beyond this. Built 
around the existing government, the PNDS (Nigerien Party for Democracy 
and Socialism), it operates by controlling dissenting voices and by distribu-
ting government revenue that it monitors closely. 
- The grey economy as an integration factor and social safety valve. 
Although it is undeniably a source of spreading, or even of triggering the 
rebellion, the grey economy also currently appears to be one of the factors 
for the relative stability in northern Niger. It also acts as a social safety valve 
in this area, without turning into armed violence because of the integra-
ting qualities of its networks. It is a factor of conflict when it is subject to 
rivalries, as in Mali since the start of the 2000s, but the grey economy can 
produce integration when it is controlled by a small circle which channels 
the involvement of autonomous actors, or even co-opts and retains them. 
This configuration, which is fragile and risky in the medium-/long-term, is a 
short-term element of social peace. The challenge for international peace 
engineers is to now successfully take the criminal economy into account in 
peace dynamics. 
- The use of armed deterrence. While the use of force – when it is 
reflected by atrocities and increased distrust in the state – favours rebel 
dynamics, it can also be a solution for states when the rebellion has broken 
out. Thus, the use of air strikes was one of the reasons for the MNJ’s 
disarmament in 2009. Since then, this armed deterrence has even been 
reinforced by the US and French military presence which is an essential 
parameter in the risk/benefit analysis of triggering a rebellion. In January 
2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré, tried to use the same strategy of 
deterrence, but the extent of the militant base and the military resources 
deployed by the MNLA and Ansar Dine, a militant Islamist group, (with 
support from AQMI) made this strategy meaningless. 
- The repeated call for decentralisation. In Mali, like in Niger, decen-
tralisation has proceeded through the different rebellions and subsequent 
peace accords. However, the effectiveness of the link between decentrali-
sation and peace is questionable. Although the process allows for the legi-
timate emergence (with the population’s blessing) of former rebel leaders 
to posts of responsibility, this process can also be a source of conflict. In 
Mali, decentralisation has sharpened inter-community tensions and so 
fuelled a pre-rebellion context. The lower polarisation of tribal identities in 
Niger partially protects the country from such risks. 
- HACP: an innovative institution. In some respects, Niger has begun a 
peacebuilding phase, with the HACP being the favoured institutional ins-
trument for peace consolidation. The institution, which was founded in 
1995, is the institutional common theme linking the peace process from 
the first rebellion to today, with the HACP continually redefining its role 
in terms of the country’s security and political priorities. On the contrary, 
Mali has no similar organisation which has been working for peace conso-
lidation continually since 1990. Institutions founded so far (the Northern 
Commission and the and -Northern Mali Development Agency) have suffe-
red from a lack of political support or from community instrumentalisation 
(unlike the HACP) and have declined. 
- Use of militias. The rebellions in Niger and Mali have been largely des-
troyed or put down because of internal divisions. However, these divisions 
have often been encouraged by the Nigerien and Malian states, as the 
result of strategies that could go as far as state support for the creation of 
civilian militias. Although such support is a constant feature of Malian poli-
tics in northern Mali, what remains clear however is that Niger has always 
managed to maintain control of these strategies, benefiting from a context 
of weaker tribal polarisation than in Mali. Although these strategies for 
maintaining order in the Sahara with a parastatal force have been effective 
until recently, they are no longer sufficient. The grey economy (which often 
justifies possession of a weapon), combined with the sequences of rebel-
lion since 1990, has made access to weapons widespread to all groups, 
depriving one tribe in particular of the ability to ensure “hegemonic sta-
bility.” 
- Foreign mediations. All the rebellions were put down by the inter-
vention of regional mediators who generally have a hidden agenda of 
satisfying their own national interests. Indeed, Algeria or Libya (before its 
collapse), which are the interested mediators, are especially concerned 
with extending their influence in their southern areas. These Algerian or 
Libyan interventions are largely based on elitist co-optations making it pos-
sible to effectively put down rebellions, but which are in many respects 
destabilising. In the mediation arena, the very heterogeneous internatio-
nal community plays a role which also causes interference. 
- Peace from below. In a “multi-track” approach, peacemaking involves 
superimposing regional and micro-local approaches. These put local actors 
at the heart of decision-making and are intended to settle smaller scale 
conflicts that peace accords cannot manage. However, these local pro-
cesses can no longer only be conducted by somewhat weakened traditio-
nal leaders. These processes, like what happened at Anefif in September 
2015, established the influence of the armed men, as well as their reliance 
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Making Peace, Building the State
introduction
Up until independence, communities in the Saharan-Sahelian region, 
particularly in present-day Mali and Niger, occupied territories and deve-
loped social, commercial, or cultural proximities or rivalries without much 
relation to the post-colonial state borders. The political integration of 
sedentary populations in the state framework of independence was gene-
rally smoother than that of the nomadic communities, particularly the 
Tuaregs. Since independence, in Mali and to a lesser extent in Niger, state 
power, which has its political and social bases in the southern parts of both 
these countries, is struggling to establish its legitimacy in the north. It is 
regularly subject to protests from this area. This opposition is expressed by 
civil engagement (civil society, involvement in competition of the political 
parties, etc.) or, more dramatically, by armed struggle (rebellions). Up until 
now, there has been recurring armed struggle without having necessarily 
been preceded by non-violent cycles of protest.
However, the central-peripheral geographical divide is not sufficient to 
explain the rebellions’ cyclicity. The respective norths of Niger and Mali 
are not homogeneous sociological or politically harmonious areas. They 
are interspersed with internal social stratifications in constant renegotia-
tion, tribal and economic rivalries, or generational tensions. Not everyone 
is opposed to the central government. Furthermore, the northern peri-
phery does not have the monopoly on violent protest, which, especially in 
Mali, is spreading to the centre with the emergence of jihadist groups and 
self-defence organisations. Our approach therefore should not be limited 
to an analysis of the north-south divide, despite its incontestable structu-
ring power. It will be based on the web of actors at different levels and will 
examine their political objectives, as well as their modes of operation. 
This study is interested in how these sequences of political and security 
protests are managed by the state, but also by other sub- or supra-state 
authorities. We are mainly focusing on the recent crises (since the start of 
the 1990s) and their inclusion in the respective political trajectories of Mali 
and Niger. Both countries are affected by rebellions and forms of violence 
which seem fairly similar, but the crises are far from having the same inten-
sity or the same state response, for reasons that we will try to identify. 
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The document is organised as follows: the first section tries to situate 
our study in the context of peace studies and details our methodologi-
cal choices. Peacekeeping operations examined in the study are mainly to 
stop the violent hostilities and to ensure that the mobilisations are put 
down. Therefore, they come under what is called peacemaking in peace 
engineering. This approach is favoured in the Malian and Nigerien political 
arenas, at the expense of other more ambitious and longer-term peace 
consolidation efforts. We also discuss the scales of action for peace, as 
assessed in the specialist literature, and their relevance to the Nigerien 
and Malian cases. The second section of the document factually recounts 
the episodes of rebellion which have affected Mali and Niger since their 
independence. The third section revisits each of these protest episodes in 
a more analytical way in order to understand the logics which guide violent 
action and to trace its continuation or cessation. Our observation is that 
there is an increasing complexification of the issues and, therefore, of the 
possible modalities of controlling them. An attempt at a simple synthesis 
of the logics of violent action is presented at the end of this section. The 
fourth section assesses the respective policies used for peace in Mali and 
Niger. 
The range of peacemaking methods is broad. Our review discusses the 
state use of force, as well as non-repressive methods of peacemaking. It 
also discusses the formal and informal remedies used, expanding the latter, 
which are also those where scientific literature is weakest. Our observation 
is the complexification and commodification of peacemaking methods are 
a reflection of changes in the use of irregular violence described in the 
section. The fifth section concludes. 
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i – Peace ProceSS and the Scale For violent 
conFlictS reSolution
This study is mainly empirical, but informs the field of peace studies 
in at least three ways. Firstly, it questions the ability of the legitimate 
sequence of “peacemaking/peace consolidation/peacebuilding” to 
account for the Sahelian realities of controlling violent crises. Secondly, it 
provides insight into current academic debates about the relevant levels 
of dialogue to achieve peace, as well as the “hybrid governance” which 
might result. Finally, on a more normative level, it illustrates the difficulties 
in establishing legitimate political orders despite taking account of actors 
considered as legitimate or representative. 
continuouS makeShiFt Peace
In the practical categories of peace engineering, “peacemaking” differs 
significantly from peace-implementation and peacebuilding. Peacemaking 
refers to the mediation process leading to the signature of an accord ending 
a conflict (JENKINS, 2013, p 20). Implementation refers to its consolida-
tion1. Finally, peacebuilding is a long-term undertaking that is supposed to 
result in the participation of all parties to the conflict and to the develop-
ment of institutions and governance frameworks to prevent crises from 
recurring (JENKINS, 2013, p 20).
The peace processes in the Sahel are much more about peace making 
than building over time. This second process, as defined legitimately, has 
not been completed in either Mali or Niger. The preoccupation with short-
term order and stability prevails in both Sahelian states2. As we will see 
further on, the academic division of peace interventions into sequences 
supposed to follow one another logically does not hold, or not completely, 
1. In the context of this study, we will regularly reinforce the importance of peace 
consolidation, without explicitly referring to “peace implementation.”
2. These choices echo a broader observation, applicable to the United Nations’ 
peacebuilding model in which order and stability predominate, in line with the 
expectations of national elites. Such an approach amounts to “consolidating the 
status quo without driving major change, which is contradictory to the claim of 
helping to build peace.” Béatrice Pouligny, “La ‘construction de la paix’”, in AFRI, 
volume IV, Centre Thucydide, 2003.
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in the Sahel, although this can be substituted with circumstantial (but dedi-
cated) efforts to silence the weapons and prevent mobilisations reforming 
too quickly. A precarious and makeshift peace is often the result, which 
consumes time and money, and requires skilful arbitration, according to 
a logic of bargaining very well described by De Waal (2010) about Sudan. 
Here, we are able to hypothesise that this patching together demonstrates 
and maintains a form of low-cost security governance. 
This short-termism in resolving conflicts contributes to the recurrence 
of rebellions (with a rate of rebellion which has been accelerating in Mali 
since 1963), to the point that it can be considered that the state of low-in-
tensity war in Mali is quasi-permanent. The recurring violence prevents 
the isolation of the rebellions and the resulting peace policies. Rebellions 
and state responses are part of the same political sequence. On the one 
hand, there is not a rebellion which is prepared far from the state’s scru-
tiny, and on the other hand, the state is forced to respond to it with excep-
tional measures. 
Each rebel episode is derived from state policies, which are adjusted 
to calm tensions while frequently sowing the seeds of the next rebellion. 
Basically, violence is hence not a derailment of normal political life, but 
one of its modalities. The subject studied here is not perhaps so much the 
respective peace policy in Mali and Niger, as the escalation/de-escalation 
processes of violence in a political arena where violence is instrumental3.
Which intermediarieS For Peace?
Although interventions by third parties in a conflict are almost unani-
mously considered as effective by econometric studies4, qualitative studies 
3. The crisis initiated in Mali in 2012 may be outside of this model: its scale threat-
ened the very survival of the Malian political system, which was finally saved by 
foreign intervention. The low-intensity violence which reigned in Mali before this 
rebellion really seemed at the heart of the functioning of what was called under 
Amadou Toumani Toure’s presidency the “Malian consensus.” 
4. In real terms, it is statistically proven that the recurrence of conflicts is less in 
war zones where there has been an intervention by a third party than in war zones 
which have not hosted a peacekeeping force. Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peace-
keeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton University 
Press, 2008.
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lead to more nuanced normative considerations. Third-party interventions 
must indeed be disaggregated in order to understand their effectiveness 
better. The practical side of peacemaking crucially relies on identifying 
actors likely to influence the course of events. Anyone involved in media-
tion must decide whether the approach favours “track one” (preferential 
negotiation with institutional actors), “track two” (minor actors who are 
operationally important) or “multi-track” (several levels of simultaneous 
mediation) options. Peace studies emphasise the need to include local 
actors and knowledge in peace processes and criticise the likely harm of 
top-down processes which favour state actors and elites (AUTESSERRE, 
2011).
Since the advent of the security/development agenda which coincides 
roughly with that of human security from the second half of the 1990s, 
security considerations have been questioning the state’s role. Considering 
security as a legitimate expectation of the people implies that the state 
is not perhaps the only source for setting security priorities (LUCKHAM, 
2015). Building on this reasoning also implies that in practical terms the 
state is not the sole actor in security governance. It can also be accom-
panied by (or coupled with), from top-down, supranational, bilateral, or 
multi-lateral tutelage or interference, and from bottom-up, by local autho-
rities (traditional, religious, NGOs, etc.) Although the overwhelming inter-
vention of international organisations is often discredited for its doubtful 
legitimacy, “local” has become the dominant intellectual outlook in peace 
studies. 
Although the consideration of local and micro-local interests is crucial 
in the search for peace, our study tempers this enthusiasm5. We are not 
making the local element the ultimate key to resolving conflicts. There 
is no reason to suppose a priori that communities have adequate diplo-
matic resources to control conflicts for at least two reasons. Firstly, the 
“local” element is interspersed with tensions and conflicts, sometimes of 
long-standing without an immediate solution, and can be represented by 
people with a lack of legitimacy. Secondly, the dynamics of local conflicts 
are themselves very sensitive to the dynamics of more encompassing divi-
sions: state, cross-border, mafia, etc.
5. See Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, “The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid 
Political Orders: a Reappraisal of the Hybrid Turn in Peacebuilding”, International 
Peacekeeping, 23:2, 2016.
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Promoting peace is therefore not only addressing the “right” local 
actors (“women”, “young people”, “community leaders”), but it is unders-
tanding how they fit into the nested conflicts and unravelling the challen-
ges and motivations for their participation or non-participation. These 
institutional entanglements and their political economy, leading to types 
of “hybrid” security governance (BAGAYOKO et al., 2016), can be competi-
tive or co-operative, long-term or not, transparent or opaque. In practical 
terms, finding the right balance between the interests of all these actors is 
undoubtedly the key to peace in the Sahel. 
The Sahelian area is a particularly fertile field to observe these tangled 
dynamics. The local, regional, national and international issues are closely 
intertwined and shape the dynamics of peacebuilding and peace consoli-
dation, and with it that of the state. All categories of actors must be taken 
into account – non-state actors (armed groups, religious groups and civil 
society), state actors, regional actors and international actors - to lead 
to a “multi-track” type approach. Each peace process in Mali and Niger 
since 1990 has seen these different actors interfere. Algeria and Libya have 
always been involved in managing regional mediations, either by being 
asked, or by imposing themselves because of their close (or even collabora-
tive) links with the armed groups. The short-term motivations which drive 
these states, make them strong partners “to make peace”, but less to build 
it in the long term, as is demonstrated by the volatility of the commitments 
made, illustrated not least by the lack of application of the various peace 
accords concluded in Algeria since 1991. These regional processes, which 
have been conducted more or less harmoniously with the states involved, 
have frequently been coupled with smaller, mostly informal dynamics, res-
ponsible for translating the general terms, formulated by the agreements 
ratified at the higher level of mediation, locally. This is the case, as we will 
see in detail further on, for the Bourem process in 1994 and the Anefif 
process in 2015, each of which marked the end of (very temporarily in the 
case of Anefif) episodes of rebellion in Mali.
legitimacy oF the Peace ProceSSeS
Even if the levels of intervention are appropriately identified, nothing 
guarantees that the process set in motion will be converted into legitimacy 
on the ground. This study aims to understand, in a comparative perspec-
tive, the state and parastatal modalities for managing security alerts and 
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crises, while evaluating more speculatively, how these modalities contri-
bute to building the state. Legitimacy can be built in two directions: by gai-
ning recognition from domestic populations (internal legitimacy) or from 
the international community (external legitimacy). In the specific case of 
so-called “fragile” states, which include Mali and Niger according to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)6, legiti-
macy can be expressed through actors with no institutional existence, but 
acting on behalf of the state with its approval. This is the case for pro-go-
vernment militias. We call these actors “parastatal”. Armed or unarmed 
non-state actors (for example traditional leaders) may also enjoy greater 
or lesser legitimacy (CLEMENTS, 2014). The legitimacy is in fine a more 
empirical than theoretical matter, extremely sensitive to the context and 
therefore intrinsically volatile and to being continuously rebuilt. 
In order to “manufacture” legitimacy in the Sahel, like in many other 
places, the international community prefers an institutional ready-made 
policy in the form of elections or decentralisation, rather than the patient 
development of consensual local institutions. Nevertheless, legitimacy 
created in this way is exclusively external. It enables diplomacy and inter-
national aid to resume their routine, but not necessarily to reconcile a 
weakened domestic social fabric. As we will show further on, the states 
nevertheless supplement the formal institutional arsenal with effective 
informal methods. 
Study methodology
The empirical work, which our observations are based on, refers to 
several episodes of political violence in Mali and Niger. These are not 
chosen to test an existing theory, but for exploratory purposes. The main 
criterion for their selection is that they correspond to very recent conflict 
sequences (since the last rebellion in Mali in 2012): it is the current poli-
tical interactions which interest us. Among other cases, we will analyse 
the conflict between the Fulani and the Dawsahak on the Niger-Malian 
border, the developing conflict in the Mopti region, or even the creation of 
the Collective for Renewal and Innovation (CRI) in Niger and the National 
Movement for Azawad (MNA) in Mali. 
6. OCDE, “States of Fragility 2015, Meeting post-2015 Ambitions”, 26 March 2015.
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This study draws on existing literature on peace studies and the Tuareg 
rebellions in Niger and Mali. The latter category of literature, which is 
plentiful in the disciplines of sociology or history, struggles to explain 
the complexity of contemporary dynamics. The study is therefore mainly 
based on two field missions in Niger (May and June 2016) and one in Mali 
(May 2016). Most of these field missions were carried out in the capitals 
for obvious security reasons, but however a trip to Agadez was made 
(February 2016). More than 50 interviews were conducted on these occa-
sions, mainly with actors who had or still have a role related to these rebel-
lions: rebels, traders or actors in the grey economy7, civil servants, tribal 
leaders and ministers. We include in these studies empirical material col-
lected in other fields8 conducted since the start of the 2000s and which is 
useful for the issue being dealt with here. 
7. We have kept the term grey economy to encompass smuggling and trafficking 
activities to avoid any moral judgement on the people involved. Furthermore, we 
preferred this term to that of organised crime, as on the one hand, the political 
economy that we are talking about seems to include much more than criminal 
interests, and on the other hand organised crime assumes a level of organisation 
and division of labour which can be found in the Sahel, but in a non-systematic 
way. The term trafficking has been used sometimes when, for the purposes of the 
study, we explicitly refer to drug trafficking, which is currently most lucrative in 
the Sahel. 
8. Conducted in both countries and in other states in the region.
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ii – niger-mali: rebel trajectorieS comPared 
This section identifies the study subject by setting out in broad terms 
the recurring rebel episodes in the Malian and Nigerien peripheries. These 
episodes and some of their empirical characteristics are summarised in 
Table 1 below. 












Fihroun Not formalized. 















Alfellaga Zeyd Ag Attaher Not formalized. 
Rejection of Malian 




MPLA Iyad Ag Ghaly Autonomy for north-
ern Mali. Reduced 
Malian military pres-
ence in the north.
Peace accord, 
fragmentation 

























the 1991 National 














the 1995 Peace Ac-
cord: acceleration of 
decentralisation10; 
regional distribution 















Establishment of a 









910 Niger and Mali are both geographically divided between a south where 
political power is concentrated - and therefore held by political elites 
from the majority communities (Malinke, Bambara, Fulani in Mali – Zar-
ma, Hausa in Niger) -, and a Saharan north far from its south, both geo-
graphically in Mali (with the Niger river cutting the country in two), eco-
nomically11 and from an identity point of view12. This division is the model 
for the emancipatory discourse driven by the successive rebellions in Mali 
and Niger up until today. 
Religiously motivated revolts with support from marabouts had been 
breaking out in West Africa as early as 1916, particularly in Mali and 
Niger. In Mali, Fihroun attacked the French occupier in the Menaka region, 
before six months later, Kaocen launched a long revolt against colonial 
forces in the Aïr region with the support of the Libyan Senoussi brothe-
rhood (FUGLESTAD, 1973). These anti-colonial revolts were not specific 
to Niger and Mali, they affected many West African countries (Senegal, 
Libya, Algeria, etc.). However, they demonstrate a characteristic which 
9. See the ADC’s website.
10. See Ferdaous Bouhlel-Hardy, Yvan Guichaoua and Abdoulaye Tamboura, 
“Crises touarègues au Niger et au Mali Janvier 2008”, Seminar on 27 November 
2007, IFRI, January 2008.
11. That is to say poorly integrated in the transport networks and the national 
commercial networks. 
12. With very polarised ethnic/tribal identities between north and south.
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continues in subsequent rebellions, namely the difficulty for the initiators 
of the rebellions to unite beyond their original community: Fihroun was 
Ouillimiden; Kaocen was Ikazkazen and they hardly recruited beyond Aïr 
(DEYCARD, 2011). The rebellions certainly challenged the colonial autho-
rity, but were part of a complex local political competition, which reshuf-
fled the deck. 
The border division, which originated from internal arbitrations in the 
French colonial administration, was maintained by the newly independent 
states in 1960. It formed what the rebels criticised as a “people trap”, in 
both Mali and Niger13. Neither of these populations were in fact prepared 
for an independence which placed them de facto under the tutelage of a 
state which they did not know or scarcely knew, whose political centre was 
very far away, and only two years after the announcement of the establi-
shment of the Common Organisation of the Saharan Regions (OCRS)14. This 
lack of knowledge of the other and the resulting distrust played a signifi-
cant part in the outbreak of the first rebellion in Mali. For the historian, 
Pierre Boilley, “the history of the rebellions arose from a misunderstan-
ding,” (BOILLEY, 2013).
In Mali, as early as 1963, an extremely localised revolt broke out in the 
north of the Kidal region following a rezzou15 perpetrated against two gou-
miers16 from the Malian government, resulting in a very violent response 
by the Malian army. This first rebellion was widely documented (LECOCQ 
2010; BOILLEY 2013). Unlike subsequent rebellions, it was improvised and 
did not include any clear demands (LECOCQ 2010, p. 156). It has left a pain-
13. On this subject, Camille Lefebvre contests the validity of the recurring accusa-
tion of a strictly arbitrary division of the borders, in contradiction with the rele-
vant local political groupings. See Camille Lefebvre, Frontières de sable, frontières 
de papier, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2015.
14. It should be noted that in 1958 and 1960, respectively in Mali and Niger, 
letters and petitions by prominent Tuaregs and Arabs, including the qadi of Tim-
buktu, were signed and sent to General de Gaulle to request the incorporation 
of their communities into the French Sahara. See Frédéric Deycard, Les rébellions 
touarègues du Niger: combattants, mobilisations et culture politique, Institut 
d’études politiques de Bordeaux, 2011, p. 147.
15. A rezzou is a fast attack intended to plunder the opponent. 
16. In the Sahel, goumiers were Sahelian natives, generally meharists (camel 
troopers), responsible for intelligence and the control and arbitration of local con-
flicts for the benefit of the colonial administration. 
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ful memory-based legacy, which has never been repaired and is symbo-
lised by a few figures of southern terror like the “Butcher of Kidal”17 which 
continue to feed the imagination of the Kidal population and even more 
widely of the Tuareg communities of Timbuktu and Gao. Amidou Mariko’s 
testimony (MARIKO, 2001), when he was a sergeant in the Malian army in 
1963, is enlightening. This memory-based legacy is one of the psychologi-
cal triggers of the rebellions. 
The 1990 rebellion was a direct legacy of the 1963 one. Its base was 
established in the late 1970s by three of the four leaders of the 1963 rebel-
lion, who were refugees in Algeria, before Iyad Ag Ghaly came to take over 
the defence of the cause. Even today, many Malian rebels place their poli-
tical trajectory in keeping with the events of 1963, not only symbolically, 
but because their parents paid for this conflict with their lives. The com-
mon thread linking 1963 with 2016 is undeniably Elladi Ag Alla, son of an 
anti-colonial “social bandit” (BOILLEY 2013) and leader of the 1963 rebel-
lion, who still today unswervingly supports Iyad Ag Ghaly.
Many Malian Tuaregs, particularly in the Kidal region, inherit a protest 
culture from a very early age, built around glorious narratives or, on the 
contrary, tales of crimes and oppressions endured, which are passed down 
from generation to generation. From a methodological point of view, it is 
difficult to argue that this memory-based legacy is more rooted in Mali 
than in Niger, but the hypothesis is not unrealistic, mainly because of the 
greater extent of military or community violence in Mali than in Niger. 
Nevertheless, the rebels’ political culture underwent a major shift 
between 1963 and the 1990s: the forefront of the 1990s rebellion was 
made up of exiles who adopted, particularly in Libya, an egalitarian, qua-
si-socialist world view, rejecting the identity conservatism of the past and 
distancing itself from the traditional leadership (LECOCQ, 2010). This new 
political culture was driven by the figure of the achamor18 (ishumar in the 
plural) and was particularly spread by the powerful medium of the music 
of groups such as Tinariwen or Takrist Nakal whose cassettes passed from 
hand to hand in the desert (BELLALIMAT, 2003).
17. He was a Captain in the Malian army, Diby Sillas Diarra, held responsible for 
atrocities committed in 1964. See Pierre Boilley, “La révolte oubliée des insurgés 
de Kidal”, Alternatives Internationales 059, June 2013.
18. The term is constructed from the French word “chômeur” (unemployed) which 
corresponds to the precarious status of young Tuareg exiles in Libya or Algeria. 
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In Niger, the greater proximity between the northern and southern 
elites helped to prevent the scenario of the Malian rebellion in 1963. 
The post-independence Nigerien authorities opted for an inclusive solu-
tion, symbolized by the creation in December 1960 of the Ministry of 
Saharan and Nomadic Affairs, located at Agadez and which was direc-
ted by a Tuareg in the person of Mouddour Zakara. This choice by the 
Nigerien President, Diori Hamani, allowed the Tuaregs in Niger to engage 
in patronage networks providing them with many administrative and 
financial advantages. However, this policy was reversed with the coming 
to power of General Seyni Kountché as a result of the coup of 15 April 
1974. In particular, during the repression following the attempted coup 
in March 1976 involving two Tuaregs, the General engaged in a political 
purge forcing the Tuaregs into exile in Libya. He also abolished the Ministry 
of Saharan and Nomadic Affairs, and following the example of the Malian 
President, Moussa Traoré, moved away from the meharist model19 in force 
in northern Niger for a much more centralised military administration. The 
departure of President Kountché in 1987 eased relations with the exiled 
Tuaregs in Libya and his successor, Ali Saibou, invited the latter to return to 
participate in the National Conference. 
This sequence of relaxation deteriorated from the Tchintabaraden inci-
dent in May 1990. As of 1985, in the aftermath of a very severe drought 
in 1984, clashes between young Ishumar refugees in the Tchintabaraden 
camp and the Nigerien armed forces resulted in several deaths. 
Several thousand Ishumar continued to return from Algeria and Libya 
from 1987 to 1990, at President Ali Saibou’s invitation, in exchange for help 
with their reintegration. This never happened and resentment continuously 
increased20. In 1990, a series of isolated attacks against representatives 
of the Nigerien state and violent reprisals by the Nigerien army created a 
climate of extreme tension. In May, the prison, sub-prefecture and police 
19. A meharist is originally a person who rode a camel. The meharist model which 
was used in the Sahara at the initiative of colonial administrators, was therefore 
based on camel companies ridden by armed nomads. 
20. “Les promesses d’Ali Saibou ne furent malheureusement pas tenues faute de 
moyens matériels et financiers, sans doute plus que par négligence coupable” 
(“Ali Saibou’s promises were unfortunately not kept due to a lack of material and 
financial resources, undoubtedly more than through culpable negligence”) in Em-
manuel Grégoire, “Niger: un État à forte teneur en uranium”, Hérodote n° 142, 
2011,  p. 206-225.
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station at Tchintabaraden were attacked by assailants to obtain the release 
of Ishumar arrested in the previous weeks. It would be followed by a very 
heavy crackdown by the Nigerien armed forces (GREGOIRE, 2011). The 
handling by the Nigerien authorities, of what would later be considered as 
a “massacre” by observers, accelerated the outbreak of a rebellion already 
in the making by Nigerien Tuaregs who had returned from Libya. Like Mali, 
which is still dealing with the consequences of the trauma of 1963, Niger 
must deal with the original crime of Tchintabaraden which plays a funda-
mental role in mobilising memories and discourse. The figures of Kaocen 
and Mano Dayak are raised up as resistance heroes. 
In the same period, Mali and Niger simultaneously experienced their 
second and first Tuareg rebellions. Launched by single movements, the 
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in Mali and the 
FPLN (Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger) in Niger, they rapidly 
disintegrated because of political, personal or tribal rivalries, skilfully used 
by the state authorities. The movements fragmented, with some groups 
supporting the peace accords being criticised by others resulting from the 
splits. 
From 1995 in Niger and 1996 in Mali, the official dates of the end of these 
rebellions, until the mid-2000s, the frustration among the rebel armed 
groups stemming from not or hardly seeing the accords implemented, gra-
dually threatened the peace. In each one of these countries, several more 
or less serious skirmishes between former rebels and the security forces 
revealed the precariousness of the peace process. Contained on a piece-
meal basis by granting benefits in kind (development project, creation of 
communes, political appointments, etc.), this discontent resulted in the 
outbreak of new sequences of rebellion. The expression “residual bandi-
try” is routinely used by the local authorities and media to conceal the 
chronic security instability in the north (DEYCARD, 2011).
The May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) relaunched 
the rebellion in Mali in 2006, a rebellion which can be said to have never 
been really put down until its revival in another form in 2011. Indeed, 
the figure behind the 2006 rebellion, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, never disar-
med until his death in August 2011. In the meantime, since his Libyan exile 
which began in 2009, he moved closer to the emerging, separatist student 
movement, the MNA, to plan a new rebellion whose leadership was pro-
mised to him. The merger of the MNA and Bahanga’s forces formed the 
nucleus of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), 
to which were aggregated forces from diverse Tuareg communities and 
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“returnees” from Libya (particularly around Colonel Mohamed Ag Najim). 
Although it has been said that Ibrahim Ag Bahanga’s goal was to negotiate 
his return peacefully with President Amadou Toumani Touré21, his death 
hastened matters. The MNLA initiated hostilities against the Malian state 
from January 2012 and in partnership with three jihadist movements22, 
chased the Malian army from Azawad, before quickly being ousted by 
these same movements. 
In Niger, in 2007, the MNJ revived the violent political protest following 
the dissatisfaction of former rebel officers in the 1990s, but laid down its 
arms in 2009 after a final military defeat. The peace is still holding today. 
We now need to understand the changing foundations of the choices of 
recourse to violent action by these different acts of mobilisation, in order 
to be able to analyse the remedy activated in the following section of this 
document to enable the de-escalation of violence and, in fine, modalities 
of peacebuilding in these countries. 
21. Interview with his envoy in Bamako in 2011, Bamako, May 2016. 
22. Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), Ansar Dine and  the Movement for the 
Oneness of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The degree of co-ordination between 
the MNLA and the jihadist movements during the 2012 offensive remains a great 
and highly sensitive unknown in this crisis. 
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iii - tranSFormation oF logicS oF violent ProteSt
FactorS and reSourceS oF violent collective dynamicS
Understanding how peace is achieved in the Sahel first and foremost 
requires a grasp of the complexity of the rebels’ engagement process. This 
section is therefore dedicated to the armed movements’ formation moda-
lities which are multiple and changing. 
As specified in the first section, the rebels’ strategic decisions and 
choices are not developed in a political vacuum, according to a sequence 
which would see the rebels planning their organisation and then the state 
responding by various methods, violent or not, in compliance with the divi-
sions of peace studies: insurgency, counter-insurgency, peaceful resolu-
tion, post-conflict, etc. The rebels operate in specific political environments 
moulded by state actors among others. However, beyond the relationship 
with the state, the start of a rebel sequence results from a series of inte-
ractions with regional and international states or existing non-state actors 
(religious actors and other existing armed groups). This interactive aspect 
is essential in understanding the dynamics of rebel engagement. 
Finally, far from being uniform and on a micro-political scale, violent 
mobilisations are always the result of an aggregation of vested interests, 
personal motivations, and multiple and heterogeneous resources, com-
bined with particular event sequences (political or geopolitical), likely to 
hasten its implementation. We see rebellion as the gradual (and not neces-
sarily planned) pooling of various types of resources, which temporarily 
gives rise to violent political configuration.
Identifying the causes and attempting to put them in order analytically 
is an essential exercise in understanding the determinants of rebel engage-
ment. It is a prerequisite for understanding the conflict resolution mecha-
nisms detailed in section 4. 
This analytical study is based on the categorisation of a certain number 
of variables allowing the factors of violent mobilisation and war dynamics 
to be assessed. These variables either relate to ideological motivations 
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(the nature of the mobilised ideological repertoire) or external factors 
(clear foreign support possibly also of an ideological nature). 
A third variable, which partly depends on the previous two, corres-
ponds to the extent of the social base that the rebellion has.
The ideological repertoire includes world views, a sense of justice, 
or important normative principles that carry the rebellion along. These 
intellectual mechanisms can be drawn from different sources. They can 
have a cultural base (e.g. codes of honour and war communicated by the 
Tuareg communities), be specifically tailored and spread by the rebel lea-
ders for nationalist reasons (e.g. demand for autonomy or sharing mining 
resources), or stem from a religious doctrine (e.g. jihad). It goes without 
saying that the ideological orientation of a rebellion partly determines its 
ability to mobilise the population and frames how it can be approached 
with a view to conflict resolution. We will see that a certain number of fac-
tual elements foster this ideological repertoire: recurring mismanagement 
of droughts, partial compliance by the state with its commitments, etc. 
External resources can influence whether a rebellion breaks out or not. 
The Sahara is a highly connected area and many actors are attracted to the 
issues within it. We differentiate among them strategic resources, such as 
a realistic approach to international relations (e.g. French influence versus 
Algerian influence; Algerian influence versus Libyan or Moroccan influence; 
establishment of foreign terrorist groups, etc.) and commercial economic 
resources (e.g. control of cross-border trafficking). These resources not 
only play a triggering role, but they contribute to a large extent to the 
means available in order for a rebellion to continue. 
The extent of the social base which the supports the group partly 
results from the first two variables, as well as shaping them: the base may 
be broad if the rebellion is well equipped, just as the rebellion can be well 
equipped if a lot of people extend credit to it23. The scale of the base also 
plays a critical role in the group’s ability to formulate its demands and to 
choose or not choose the repertoire of violence in a credible way. Its scale, 
but also how its rank and file fighters and leaders are integrated with each 
other, is a good indication of its future trajectory. For example, as demons-
trated by Staniland (2014), a small close-knit group can last over time 
despite a limited political impact; a movement with a broad, but heteroge-
23. The MNLA has thus benefited from financial sacrifices by Dawsahak livestock 
owners (interview with a Dawsahak leader, Niamey, June 2016).
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neous social base can have a strong political impact but rapidly disinte-
grate; while organisations led by charismatic leaders may not survive the 
death of their leader, etc. These varied characteristics broadly shape the 
rebellion, influencing its outcome and also forming as many more or less 
effective possible responses by the state. 
These different approaches help us to analytically account for the 
violent episodes detailed in section 2, in order to reproduce both what pro-
motes their outbreak (factors) and what defines their nature (resources). 
We propose here a new interpretation of these episodes (with the intrinsic 
limitations of such an exercise24), which accounts for the changes in violent 
engagement in Mali and Niger. 
ideological reSourceS
Separatist repertoire
The protester-separatist repertoire is most evident out of those voiced 
by successive rebellions. Whether it is the rebellions of 1990 or 2007 in 
Niger, or 1963, 1990, 2006 or 2011 in Mali, the nationalist demands have 
always been the reason cited for the different rebel groups’ engagement 
with the almost unattainable prospect of independence. This repertoire 
is highly strategic, because it is the one that the international community 
has access to through formal platforms, interprets and which it attaches 
importance to. It is in this sense that we must understand the parallels 
continuously established by the political actors of the rebellion with more 
or less similar political configurations elsewhere. Thus, the leaders of the 
MNLA have often defended the legitimacy of their engagement like that of 
24. We are faced with the difficulty of an imbalance of sources: recent episodes 
are better known than older ones. Especially as, modalities of collecting informa-
tion differ from one episode to the next. Today’s researcher has other intentions in 
mind than the early 20th century colonist, whose reports foster historical studies 
relating to the first rebellions. This methodological hurdle leads us to temper the 
certainties that can be formulated about the occurrences studied and constitutes 
a limitation to the exercise which we are engaged in. 
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the Kurds in Iraq25 – strongly supported by the international community -, 
or South Sudan, or even by citing their status as an indigenous people26.
Yet, none of these rebellions has been able to obtain satisfaction. In the 
absence of independence, which is always claimed but never considered 
in the peace negotiations because of the attachment of regional and inter-
national powers to the divisions inherited from the Berlin Conference27, 
the groups have called for a rebalancing of the governance systems in both 
states in favour of their northern parts. Socio-economic marginalisation, 
exclusion from decision-making processes and under-representation in 
the security forces have constantly been criticised by these groups. 
The resulting demands have generally focused on: the nature of the 
system of territorial organisation in order to rebalance the country’s gover-
nance system – ranging from pursuit of decentralisation to self-determina-
tion or independence –; the representation of Tuareg minorities within the 
state apparatus – leading to recruitment processes in the civil service and 
to integration or reintegration in the national security forces; socio-econo-
mic investments by the states in their northern parts – leading to commit-
ments on public expenditure and infrastructure projects; more balanced 
arbitration in terms of access to natural resources (water and pastures, 
etc.). Many studies have highlighted the under-development of the nor-
thern parts of both countries (not to be confused with the standard of 
living of their populations)28, which is reflected by a lack of infrastructure, 
under-representation in the state and associated public services, while cli-
mate vulnerability29 of the populations in these areas has increased com-
pared to other regions. 
25. Interview with one of the MNLA leaders, Paris, May 2014.
26. See, for example, the MNLA’s Declaration of Independence dated 4 April 2012, 
which explicitly draws on the United Nations’ Charter and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. 
27. The Berlin Conference, which was held in 1884 and 1885, was dedicated to the 
division and partition of Africa by the European powers. 
28. Existing macroeconomic indicators show that in terms of purchasing power, 
the standards of living of the northern and southern populations are broadly 
similar. See Mathieu Pellerin, Étude des fragilités structurelles au nord du Mali, 
World Bank, 2013.
29. The recurring droughts in the Saharan belt, to which more regular flooding can 
be now added. 
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The assessment of the commitments made by the states of Niger and 
Mali in compliance with the various peace accords appears more nuanced. 
An analysis of decentralisation both in Niger and Mali, for example, leads 
to mixed results (see section 4), so much so that it no longer constitutes 
the “magic remedy” for peace processes. Indeed, decentralisation, which 
has been broken down in Mali since the end of Alpha Oumar Konaré’s 
regime and the departure of the Minister for Decentralisation, Ousmane 
Sy in 1994, is widely discredited among the rebel groups30. The authori-
ties are in fact obliged to go beyond this concept of territorial planning a 
priori adapted to the socio-economic realities of Sahelian societies (scarce 
resources in the north and under-education of northern actors) in favour 
of regionalisation or even federalism. In Niger, regionalisation - thought to 
be a solution to the 2007 MNJ rebellion - is far from being effective as the 
presidents of the regional councils, although set up in 2010 under open 
elections, complain that their prerogatives are undermined by the gover-
nors and central government31.
The relativity of the efforts agreed upon by the Nigerien and Malian 
states is such that the discourse of struggle against injustice and the histo-
ric marginalisation of the Tuareg communities is prevalent and constitutes 
a pool for recruitment and mobilisation. The MNJ’s rebellion has demons-
trated the ability to mobilise around this nationalist demand32, while the 
example of the MNA (which then became the MNLA) in Mali shows that 
the young Tuareg generation has appropriated this discourse, with as 
much if not more, vehemence than their elders33. This vengeful youth also 
exists in northern Niger. It should be recalled in particular that Nigeriens 
and Libyans are also among the founders of the MNA34.
30. Interview with several leaders from the CMA (Co-ordination of Azawad Move-
ments) and the Platform, Bamako, June 2015 and May 2016.
31. Interviews with two regional council presidents, Niamey, May 2016.
32. Interview with a former MNJ leader, Agadez, January 2016.
33. Interviews with five founding members of the MNA, Bamako, Paris, Nouak-
chott, Niamey, 2012-2016.
34. Interview with a Nigerien founding representative of the MNA, Niamey, May 
2016.
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This explicit ideological mobilisation (which is opportunely combined 
with ecological35 and anti-terrorist36arguments) is essential for the group 
to be taken seriously locally, nationally, and internationally, but may simul-
taneously conceal other logics of mobilisation. This co-existence of diffe-
rent logics even within a rebel group which is homogeneous and united in 
its demands can explain the difficulties that states have in responding to 
it. We will see afterwards that religious, economic, or community/tribal 
mobilisations can thus strongly compete with this ideological content and 
weaken the group’s coherence. 
Cultural repertoire: Saharan figures of success through political 
violence 
The figure of the rebel or the former rebel remains highly valued in 
some segments of these nomadic societies, as well as with their foreign 
partners. So, it is a mobilisation lever which is difficult to assess accurately. 
Taking up arms may be seen as a means of “renegotiating their social sta-
tus through resistance movements” (DEBOS, 2013). This figure especially 
constitutes social success because it is associated with justice (fairness of 
judgement, protection of communities, financial redistribution, etc.) refer-
ring to the trajectory of the “social bandit” theorised by Hobsbawm (1959) 
or to the “bandit of honour” associated with the Corsican vendetta (PARSI, 
2015). In addition, “emerging” (taking up arms) can represent, depending 
on the context, a mainly masculine modality of generational assertion37. 
The rebel trajectory is in many ways still a rite of passage, mandatory to 
being legitimate in Aïr or Adrar des Ifoghas. Thus, Yvan Guichaoua explains 
the rallying of the Neo-Ishumars (those who left Niger for Libya in the early 
2000s) to the MNJ through the willingness of this under-employed youth 
35. See also, Frédéric Deycard op. cit on the use of opposition to uranium mining 
by the MNJ with a view to ensuring intermediaries among the western NGOs. 
36. The notable example of the ADC, which fought the GSPC (Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat) at the end of 2006, or the MNLA when it was founded in 
2011 to win over the international community. 
37. Women are far from passive in this process. A number of interviews with 
ex-fighters highlight the encouragement given by their sisters, mothers, wives, or 
even challenges to their bravery.
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to exist politically and compete with their elders, particularly following the 
murders committed by the army against Tuareg civilians (GUICHAOUA, 
2012). The warlike figure of the Tuareg fighter seeking to avenge his tainted 
honour38 is regularly cited by the mobilised youth, but obviously does not 
exhaust the justification repertoires used by one individual to another or 
over time. 
The legitimation figures also change according to the evolution of the 
cycles of rebellion and their contents. Hence, the rise of the grey economy 
is promoting a new figure. Saley Boss is a good personification of this. A 
famous drug convoy road blocker, his character appears as an avenger to 
protect or financially help the neediest, particularly those in his commu-
nity, the Kel Ewey from Timia39. Hama Mossa, a trafficker from the Taghat 
Malet tribe in Mali40, is an eminently respected person in his home com-
munity (for among other things, due to health investments made) and in 
this sense, an undeniable source of inspiration. Since it is understood that 
many of these traffickers are engaged in rebellion (Saley Boss for a time 
with the MNJ and Hama Mossa in the MNLA in 2012), it is the rebel figure 
which is valued at the same time. 
Similarly, the revitalisation of Islam in the Sahel is also transforming 
the image and perception of the rebel. The pious rebel has become a res-
pected figure, and this figure, as paradoxical as it may seem, may even be 
combined with that of the rebel drug trafficker (still haram   forbidden)41. 
So, it is a drug trafficker who finances the building of a mosque or a reli-
38. This image is taken to extremes by the ultra-caricatural Italian film Tuareg: the 
Desert Warrior (see on Dailymotion).
39. Interview with several young Tuaregs, Agadez, January 2016. 
40. See the Wikileaks cables about him and his responsibility in drug trafficking 
mentioned. 
41. From a theological point of view, the ulamas in Afghanistan issued a fatwa 
in the 1980s making the production or sale of drugs legal (halal), since this drug 
does not affect Muslim populations. Interview with an official from the ONUDC 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Dakar, November 2015. During an 
interview with a Mauritian journalist, Isslemou Ould Moustapha Ould Salihi, the 
latter told us that many Salafists imprisoned in Mauritania after having “been in-
volved in” in drug trafficking, were adapting it religiously. A jihadist interpretation 
of this fatwa means that the drug becomes a weapon when it is intended for use 
by unbelievers. Interview with Isselmou Ould Moustapha Ould Salihi, Nouakchott, 
March 2014. 
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gious festival in northern Mali42. This social value, far from being only sym-
bolic, is mainly because these influential actors provide funds, protection, 
or even services (medical care, mining, etc.) within a political economy of 
the rebellion. 
The fact that the figure of the rebel is highly valued and constitutes a 
factor for engaging in rebellion is a serious obstacle in the search for peace. 
As a rebound effect, those who have left the world of rebellion to inte-
grate in the institutional process struggle to retain their legitimacy with 
the base. Accused of having “betrayed” the cause, having sold “their own” 
or having misappropriated the “peace dividends”, they are supplanted in 
the collective imagination by these new figures of success. This is particu-
larly the case in Mali, where against a background of extreme tension, the 
“former rebels” who retain their legitimacy with the younger generation 
are extremely rare, but also in Niger where their integration in the system 
reduces their popularity in the north, although some have managed to 
escape such disqualification43.
This figure of the Tuareg rebel does not only produce effects at the 
local level of mobilisation. Internationally, the reputation of the fearless 
meharist fighter which continues to be associated with the Tuaregs, is also 
a pool of resources for western, and particularly French actors. There is no 
lack of past examples (see section 4) to support this idea, but this image 
still persists today, whether it is members of a French parliamentary com-
mission supporting the idea that by bringing together all the Tuaregs in 
Algeria, Libya, Mali and Niger44, a shared destiny could be supported, or a 
former senior French official meeting informally with the “Tuareg leaders” 
from the four countries mentioned above to restore the meharist militias 
in 201345. Yet, for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, this 
clichéd image is particularly undermined by the development of the grey 
economy, whose actors are among those same fantasised heroes, and of 
jihadism which the Tuaregs are increasingly involved in. This distortion of 
the image of the “Blue Men” abroad produces disappointments just as 
42. Interview with an Arab-Tuareg trader from Kidal, Bamako, May 2014.
43. Interview on this subject with several young Tuareg leaders, Agadez, January 
2016.
44. Interview of one of the members of the research team, Foreign Affairs, De-
fence and Armed Forces Committee, 2013, Paris.
45. Personal observations of one of the members of the research team. 
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unfounded as were the previous representations, with some western mili-
tary being “disappointed” and developing the idea that the Tuaregs are no 
longer trusted actors, because they are too committed to terrorism46.
Religious repertoire: the place of Islam in the mobilisation and 
positioning vis-à-vis contemporary jihadist movements 
The question of the relationship of the rebellions with Islam can be 
considered from two angles. The first concerns the Islamic reference in 
the rebellion’s own rhetoric; the second is more pragmatic and strategic: 
recently autonomy movements have been overwhelmed with armed com-
petitors explicitly calling for jihad. How, then, do they position themselves 
faced with this new situation? 
It would be wrong to consider that the religion has an entirely new 
place in the political and security dynamics of the Sahel. Already in the 
19th century, Cheikhou Amadou’s Fulani Masina empire and El Hadj Umar 
Tall’s Toucouleur empire declared jihad and established theocratic empires 
in present-day Mali. Fihroun in 1916, then Kaocen in Niger, both fought 
the French coloniser in the name of jihad pronounced by the marabouts. 
Among the rebel armed groups, the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA) in 
the 1990s, and then the ADC in 2006, claimed an Islamic identity. Finally, 
the Islamic referent in the context of armed movements in the Sahel is far 
from being an exception. 
Nevertheless, the Islam which inspires the mobilisations is not immu-
table. Its return to the forefront in rebellions in the 2000s follows the 
success in Gao and especially Kidal of the pietist (non-violent) preaching 
movement Jamaat Tabligh. 
However, as Ferdaous Bouhlel points out (BOUHLEL-HARDY et al., 
2009), if religion allows for a relegitimation of actors of political violence 
(as is the case for Ibrahmin Bahanga and his men), it is not its principle. 
Islam remains an active source for decisions made without being at the 
forefront of the agenda of separatist rebellions (that only naive foreign 
observers consider as “secular”). In 2012, foreign intervention and per-
sonal quarrels, more than the content, were needed to finally prevent a 
MNLA – Ansar Dine rapprochement from happening, with the enforce-
ment of sharia as a point of consensus. The exact role of influential Islamic 
46. Personal interviews with western military personnel, Paris, 2015.
42
Making Peace, Building the State
scholars and judges and theological debates (for example to identify the 
enemy, to define alliances, decide the degree of co-operation with foreign 
forces) even within the separatist demand requires investigations which 
exceed the aim of this study. It should be noted that this study is not facili-
tated by the de facto supervision of rebel movements by the international 
forces (France and MINUSMA), who are also fighting the jihadist forces 
at the same time. Any reference to Islam then becomes suspicious, likely 
resulting in the strategic suppression of this issue by the rebel coalition. 
The revitalisation of Islam in northern Mali questions the possible 
development of the nature of rebellions, as armed protest against the 
existing government is condemned by Islamic jurisprudence, considered 
as being bidaa (falling under innovation)47. An in-depth study on this issue 
would enable Islam to be considered from a more integrative perspec-
tive. Doubtlessly, therefore the armed movements which are formed in 
the Sahel will be modified, with Islam forming an increasingly significant 
marker of identity. During the negotiations in Algiers, a meeting in July 
2015 thus saw the General Secretary of HCUA (High Council for the Unity 
of Azawad) demanding the enforcement of sharia law in northern Mali. 
Similarly, although the Islamic referents are marginal in the final text of 
the Algiers Accords, the role of the Islamic judges (qadis) is however set to 
be reinforced. 
This revived Islamic religiosity, which was non-violent up to 2012, has 
however partly descended into violence with the foundation of Ansar Dine 
at the start of the rebellion. We will discuss in the external factors how 
offensive jihad, originally imported from abroad, has gradually taken hold 
in northern Mali. 
47. Interview with an HCUA leader, Bamako, May 2016.
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Strategic Foreign and Financial interFerence 
Diplomatic interference 
Mali and Niger are surrounded by states, for which the northern parts of 
these two countries form a strategic extension. Furthermore, these states 
do not maintain good relations with Mali and Niger. The rebellions in Mali 
and in Niger are not directly provoked by these neighbouring countries, 
but when they are being prepared or exist, they open up opportunities for 
each of them to advance their agenda at the expense of their neighbours. 
Since independence, Algeria and Libya have observed and acted on 
the dynamics involving the Tuareg communities (BOILLEY, 2011), while 
Mauritania and Morocco are now conducting a more active policy in the 
Sahelian area. Although, as we will see in the next section, no peace pro-
cess could be completed without Algeria or Libya’s involvement, their role 
exceeds that of mere mediator. Interference by these states in Sahelian 
affairs is based on the influence of actors in northern Mali or northern 
Niger to satisfy economic, political, or security interests (BOILLEY, 2011)48. 
These two states in particular have always fostered a rivalry around the 
Sahel. In the opinion of some actors of the rebellion, who were origi-
nally from Kidal, the Libyan infiltration in what comes under the Algerian 
backyard in the middle of the 2000s, was among the triggers of the 2006 
rebellion. Algeria could have, at the very least, let some of its “agents” 
engage in rebellion to undermine ongoing Libyan projects, including the 
48. “La Libye utilisa sans retenue la présence sur son sol et dans ses rangs de 
ces ressortissants sahéliens pour exercer pression et influence sur le Mali et le 
Niger, soufflant le chaud et le froid, annonçant la création possible d’un « Sahara 
central », revendiquant (manifestement sans fondement: See Pierre Boilley, 
Les Touaregs Kel Adagh: dépendances et révoltes, du Soudan français au Mali 
contemporain, Karthala, 1999 reissue, 2012, 644 p.) des attaques ponctuelles 
dans les zones sahariennes par de jeunes combattants” (“Libya unreservedly 
used the presence of these Sahelian natives on its soil and in its ranks to exert 
pressure and influence on Mali and Niger, blowing hot and cold, announcing the 
possible creation of a “central Sahara”, claiming [manifestly without foundation: 
See Pierre Boilley, “Géopolitique africaine et rébellions touarègues. Approches 
locales, approches globales (1960-2011)” L’Année du Maghreb, CNRS Éditions, 
2011, Sahara en mouvement, VII] intermittent attacks in the Saharan areas by 
young fighters.”)
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establishment of the Libyan consulate at Kidal which was the most sym-
bolic example49.
The 2011 rebellion showed the decisive influence of both Algeria and 
Libya again. It now seems certain that some actors in the very complex 
web of the Algerian authorities (LEBOVICH, 2015) were able to encourage 
the foundation of Ansar Dine by Iyad Ag Ghaly, although the latter only had 
very scanty resources at the end of 2011. The reasons for such support are 
twofold: they are due to the fact that Iyad Ag Ghaly, since the 1990 rebel-
lion, has been considered very close to the Algerians and that supporting 
him in the context of this new rebellion allowed the Algerians to control 
the course of it somewhat, even though the MNLA, whose independence 
demands were known, represented for Algeria a risk of rebellious conta-
gion in its south. This concern with not “importing” Sahelian problems is 
a constant in Algerian foreign policy (CHENA, 2013). Furthermore, some 
observers also consider that this Algerian decision could have been moti-
vated by concern with responding to French interference, which is consi-
dered favourable to the Tuaregs of the MNLA50. Whatever the reasons, this 
decision has probably impacted heavily on Iyad Ag Ghaly’s decision to turn 
to violent action, without making him the puppet of a foreign power. 
During the last rebellion in Mali, the Mauritanian and Moroccan autho-
rities, also undertook to “influence” some Tuareg rebels from the MNLA 
and the MAA (Arab Movement of Azawad) to satisfy their strategic (mainly 
security) interests in the Sahel (PELLERIN, 2015). While this did not directly 
contribute to the outbreak of the rebellion, this state support provides 
rebel actors (diplomatic, financial, territorial) with essential resources and 
thus maintains the dynamics of protest. 
The geopolitical situation of the Sahelian region can also directly 
influence the logics of violent action in the Sahel. Pressure exerted by 
the former Libyan leader, Gaddafi, to make the Ishumars return to Niger 
in the late 1980s, was indirectly the source of the first Tuareg rebellion. 
More recently in 2011, the civil war in Libya and the collapse of Gaddafi’s 
regime have in fact convinced some former rebels and Ishumars to return 
home, which gave the Malian rebellion an unprecedented scale in history. 
49. Interviews with several leaders of the Tuareg rebellions in Mali, Bamako and 
Nouakchott, 2014-1016.
50. Interview with several leaders of Tuareg rebellions in Mali, including some of 
whom are close to the Algerian authorities, Bamako and Nouakchott, 2014-1016.
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However, in both these specific cases, the decision to engage in rebellion 
had been made independently of the Libyan situation, which facilitated or 
accelerated the course of events. 
Even beyond the region, the action of European states can prove deci-
sive in the decision to turn to violent action. As early as 1963, it would 
seem that Zeyd Ag Intallah’s willingness to engage in rebellion was moti-
vated by the hope that France and Algeria would endorse this underta-
king51 (LECOCQ, 2011). This demonstrates that the logic of violent action 
has always been partly determined by the regional and international 
environment. From this point of view, as the former colonial power still 
watching over its interests in the Sahel, France is regularly singled out 
for its interference. These are official (involvement of the DGSE (General 
Directorate for External Security) in the 1991 rebellion in Niger recounted 
notably by Emmanuel Grégoire or involvement by the Danielle Mitterrand 
Foundation in favour of some Nigerien Tuareg rebels52) or not. The latter 
would merit a separate investigation. Since the colonial era, some military 
circles have maintained a certain romanticism for the desert and its Blue 
Men53. Strong Franco-Tuareg friendships have also been made in the civil 
system, among the media, mainly through the Paris-Dakar Rally car race. 
The twinning of towns has allowed for decentralised co-operative actions 
for the benefit of the Tuareg communities; tourism has given rise to many 
desert lovers and ears mindful of the fate of the Tuareg populations. These 
combined proximities form useful support intermediaries during rebellions 
(CASAJUS, 1995)54. During 2007, the prominent Nigerien Tuareg, Issouf Ag 
Maha, spared no efforts in gathering assistance, even highlighting in his 
speech topics (anti-nuclear struggle) more in tune with the expectations 
of his western audience than with the expectations of his militant base. 
However, the most striking co-operation between the rebel movements 
and the French authorities is the very explicit one, which linked them at 
51. Pierre Boilley, op. cit., 1999, details extensively how the OCRS was driven on by 
colonial officers, who were also active in promoting this project with their Tuareg 
contacts. 
52. Emmanuel Grégoire, op. cit. 
53. In 2012 and 2013, we met MNLA representatives boasting of always finding an 
open door at the Ministry of Defence. 
54. We quote the case of the former French Member of the European Parliament, 
François Alfonsi, who supported the MNLA from 2012.
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the time of Operation Serval and which resulted in the relocation of those 
people in Kidal who now form the CMA. 
Jihadist interference and endogenisation of jihad 
Rebellions require before anything else possession of weapons, and 
composite alliances can be formed with groups which already have a 
military arsenal. They can be triggered by the support of foreign fighters, 
whether they be trafficking militias or especially terrorist groups. We will 
see in this section that although terrorism was originally an unknown phe-
nomenon in Mali – including the identity of its actors – it has become an 
integral part of the Malian political and rebel arena. We are choosing to 
classify it in the category of external resources, as its roots are external, 
but Sahelian terrorism should be considered as being endogenous from 
now on. 
Up to the late 1990s, the Sahel was spared any terrorist contagion, par-
ticularly from Algeria which was then plagued by a civil war that had seen 
the birth of several jihadist groups. However, elements of the GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group) fleeing the repression of the Algerian army, and then its 
successor the GSPC from 1997, found refuge in Niger and then in Mali. 
The implantation in the Sahelian belt was then assured over the years, 
with the Malian territory appearing more favourable for sanctuary for the 
terrorist groups than Niger. The GSPC initially received a relatively cold 
welcome in northern Mali, without the Malian army and foreign powers 
undertaking an offensive against them. This indifference is explained both 
by the relative powerlessness of the Malian security forces and by the fact 
that President ATT considered this threat as a matter for Algeria55. Despite 
some attempts to eliminate GSPC (which became AQMI in 2007) figh-
ters by the Tuaregs, who were probably supported by the Malian state or 
foreign states, up to 200956, co-existence between AQMI and the Malian 
state would remain peaceful. Better still, it gradually gave rise to business 
relations, in turn affecting the security of the drug convoys, the supply of 
overpriced logistics, and above all intermediation in the release of hos-
tages. These business relations were gradually combined with ideological 
55. Pierre-François Naudé, “AQMI: pourquoi Bamako refuse d’y aller?”, Jeune 
Afrique, 24 September 2010.
56. Interviews with several of the original leaders from Kidal, Bamako and Nouak-
chott, 2015-2016.
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affinities, with the case of Iyad Ag Ghaly, being iconic from this point of 
view. From 2009, however, following the execution of the British hostage, 
Edwin Dyer, and the assassination of Colonel Lamana Ould Bou by AQMI 
in the Timbuktu region, the Malian state tried to carry out a major opera-
tion (Operation Djigui) against the terrorist organisation resulting in heavy 
losses on the Malian side57. This episode would have convinced AQMI that 
the Malian state supported by the western armies, was an obstacle to its 
development in northern Mali58. It was against this background that the 
2011 rebellion took place. Although the MNLA cannot be accused of col-
lusion with AQMI, from the first battles against the Malian army, the rebel 
movement relied on the power of Ansar Dine, which at the time it was 
clear was based on the terrorist organisation’s resources. The capture of 
northern Mali in 2011 was therefore achieved through a circumstantial 
alliance between the rebels and three terrorist groups (AQMI, Ansar Dine 
and MUJAO). 
Beyond the normative considerations regarding the perception of 
these terrorist groups, since 2011 it is no longer possible to think about the 
rebellion in Mali in isolation from the Sahelian terrorist groups. According 
to an adage commonly quoted in nomadic circles, “Kiss the hand that you 
cannot sever.” In other words, considering the financial and military supe-
riority of the terrorist groups, built up as a result of the combined inactivity 
of Mali and its regional neighbours, there are very few who undertake to 
fight them locally. A fortiori, when the jihad is caused by former figures of 
previous rebellions, such as Iyad Ag Ghaly, in whose fold are most of his 
fighters who have been faithful to him since 1990. 
Not only are the population, as well as the rebel groups, forced to deal 
with the jihadist groups, but the latter provide resources to groups which 
so far had no access to rebellion. From this point of view, the example of 
the Fulani, originally from Tillabéry, who joined MUJAO in 201259, like that 
of the Fulani of Mopti who joined Katiba Macina-Ansar Dine from 2015 
(ICG, 2016), are textbook cases. 
57. Link to the Wikileaks cables about this. 
58. Interview with an Arab from Timbuktu, Bamako, May 2016.
59. Interview with a Fulani who was a member of the MUJAO in Gao, Bamako, 
May 2016.
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The switch of the young Fulani from Tillabéry to MUJAO is very direc-
tly related to inter-community clashes between Tuaregs of the Dawsahak 
tribe and Tolobe Fulani from the Tillabéry region, who have been overwhel-
mingly migrating into the Gao region since the 1990s. These deadly cla-
shes were originally due to tensions over the region’s pastoral resources. 
Against a background of an ongoing reduction in cultivable land, the Fulani 
herdsmen from Tillabéry have gradually been required to flee the agricul-
tural lands occupied by the Zarma populations in Niger to migrate to Mali 
with their livestock. 
This has accentuated rivalries with the Dawsahak Tuaregs in the Menaka 
region, who, after the outbreak of the 1990 rebellion, took advantage of 
the available weapons to form self-defence militias against the Fulani60. 
What was simply a pastoral conflict then turned into an inter-community 
armed clash, with the Nigerien Fulani seeking to protect themselves in 
their turn, if need be by finding support within the Nigerien state appa-
ratus to form militias61. This forming of militias which has been at work 
since the late 1990s has been largely fuelled by the appetite of the leaders 
of each community involved in the theft and resale of livestock, involving 
a politically connected mafia which was getting rich in this way and for 
whom any peace process could be a synonymous with impoverishment. 
The 2012 rebellion again changed the nature of this conflict, with a part of 
the Dawsahak Tuaregs joining the MNLA. In reaction to, and out of fear that 
this was to their disadvantage, the Fulani then chose to engage extensively 
in MUJAO, finding a “security umbrella” in the terrorist group. The armed 
groups have since taken this issue hostage, considerably complexifying its 
solution. Although some local and international NGOs strive to bring the 
grass-roots communities closer together, the initiatives come into conflict 
with the rivalries between the armed groups, under pressure from the 
jihadist groups who use these inter-community tensions for recruitment 
purposes, and finally the mafia, which in addition to operating in livestock 
theft, now operates as a recruitment broker for the benefit of these jiha-
dist groups. This multi-faceted conflict has mutated to the point of making 
it almost impossible to settle at present.
60. Interview with an actor engaged in mediation between the tribes involved, 
Bamako, May 2016. 
61. Interview with a Nigerien official responsible for peace consolidation issues, 
Niamey, May 2016.
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The case of the Fulani from the Mopti region follows a similar pattern. 
Many Fulani suffocated by the pastoral tensions, by land speculation 
in the Office du Niger, a semi-autonomous government agency in Mali, 
a white-collar “livestock mafia” (even within the Fulani community this 
time), and above all systematic harassment by Malian state officials (water 
and forest officials and gendarmes), found in Hamadoun Kouffa and his 
movement a means to take justice into their own hands (ICG, 2016; ISS, 
2016). There are other populations (Soninke and Dogon), like this commu-
nity, whose frustrations are worked on by the jihadist groups, paving the 
way for future conflicts where community-based claims will be found to be 
satisfied by means of the jihadist groups. For some socially marginalised 
communities, the terrorist groups have represented an opportunity to 
access a social status that the highly stratified Sahelian society62 hampered. 
This is precisely the case of the Arab Al Wasra tribe in the Timbuktu region, 
which is now almost fully committed to AQMI’s cause and has become, 
consequently, essential in managing public affairs in the Taoudéni region63.
Thus, it appears that some of the causes which have inspired joining 
the rebel cause – injustice and the opportunity to exist socially – are 
among the main causes for engaging in jihadist groups64. It can even be 
argued that these latter groups are more likely to respond to the fighters’ 
demands than the rebel groups and the state. Many interviews with the 
inhabitants of Gao and Timbuktu reveal that during the time of the jiha-
dist occupation in 2012, the justice administered by the qadis on behalf of 
AQMI was fair and effective65. The endogenisation of jihad is a source of 
concern in the long term. 
Economic and financial resources
The Sahelian economy is based on traditional resources, including some 
like livestock rearing which have been undermined by climate vulnerabi-
62. See also Ibrahim Ag Youssouf, Ferdaous Bouhlel et al.,Études sur les straté-
gies de développement économique et social des régions nord du Mali, PSPSDN, 
2012.
63. Interview with a prominent Arab from the Timbuktu region, Bamako, May 
2016.
64. Mathieu Pellerin, Study on the radicalisation phenomenon in Mali on behalf of 
the European Union, June 2016.
65. Interviews with inhabitants of these two regions, Bamako, May 2016.
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lity, while others like tourism have been drained by the regular insecurity 
since the early 2000s. The barter trade, whose roots go back to the cara-
van trade and which has existed since the raising of borders as smuggling 
(SCHEELE, 2012; PELLERIN et al., 2014) has therefore emerged as a leading 
resource and which has gradually diversified with the arrival of prohibited 
products (drugs and weapons) with very high added value. These prohi-
bited products, whose market circulation by definition comes under traf-
ficking and not smuggling, now constitute an essential form of financing 
for present-day rebellions. 
Therefore, their economic model has nothing to do with the that 
of 1990s. Until the first rebellion in the 1990s, the main method of 
financing for armed groups was inspired by rezzous or akafal (total 
looting of strangers) and by ambushing civilians or soldiers to steal 
their equipment. The actors in the 1990 rebellion testified to the 
difficulties experienced in obtaining military equipment, and were 
forced to attack barracks to acquire weapons and to loot the pre-
mises of NGOs to provide themselves with vehicles66. The emergence 
of the grey economy (cigarette, weapons and then drugs networks) 
has considerably altered the situation, leading to financial stakes of 
a different scale. Although many authors, mainly economists, sup-
port the idea that the rebellions are mainly predatory (COLLIER, 
HOEFFLER, 2004), or even that the rebels would simply have become 
traffickers (GROSSMAN, 1999), we set ourselves apart from such a 
position which would neutralise the other factors, particularly the 
political and social ones. Moreover, it would be a mistake to consider 
that the grey economy is only undertaken by the rebels, and that it is 
not subject to any competition with state-related actors. 
However, arguably the traffickers’ interests have considerably 
reshaped the scales of armed engagement, as well as remodelling 
the factors for turning to violent action. First of all, they are a new 
source of available funding and the most important one nowadays67. 
In Mali, the first contribution by the drug traffickers may date back 
66. Interview with an ex-front-line leader of the MPLA, Bamako, November 2012. 
67. Interview with an actor who described himself as a “trafficker” in northern 
Mali, Telephone interview, September 2015.
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to 2006, shortly after the outbreak of the Malian rebellion on 23 
May. The drug traffickers from the Kidal region were asked by Iyad 
Ag Ghaly to contribute to the war effort68, de facto broadening 
the extent of the rebellion. In addition to financing and therefore 
broadening its extent, the grey economy can even be a driving force 
for violent action, appearing very directly as a source of instability 
for the Sahel. Many consistent testimonies maintain that the MNJ 
is a movement originally created by Nigerien and Algerian drug traf-
fickers69 to serve as a screen for the development of illegal activi-
ties. The same reasoning can also be maintained with regard to the 
Malian rebellion in 2011, which quickly seemed to serve as a cover 
for the drug traffickers. For the MNJ, as for the MNLA, the rebellion 
was an opportunity to recover drug trafficking routes controlled by 
other actors, particularly Arabs, who had benefited from the sup-
port of the Malian or Algerian authorities70.
The development of the grey economy (and particularly the traf-
ficking networks, and specifically drugs) has redefined the alliance 
processes with the risk for the states that these networks will finance 
new rebellions against them. Therefore, controlling the routes has 
become an issue of sovereignty in addition to satisfying the appetite 
of the criminal networks. In this case, the Malian authorities would 
hence have sought to establish this link between the trafficker-re-
bels, by offering the most loyal tribal groups to the Malian state, 
control of some networks71. Although, this strategy has helped 
reduce the funding capacity of some tribes in the Kidal region, this 
has especially helped to accentuate tribal rivalries, which was one of 
the main factors for engaging in the 2006 and 2011 rebellions. 
68. Interview with an elected representative from Kidal, Bamako, January 2012.
69. Interview with former members of the MNJ and Nigerien officials, Niamey 
and Agadez, January 2016.
70. See also Wolfram Cacher “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara 
Region,” Carnegie Paper, 2012.
71. See Wolfram Lacher, Ibid., Interview with a General in the Malian army, Ba-
mako, May 2016.
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On the basis of quite a few findings, the grey economy will remain 
at the heart of the war and political economy in northern Mali, fol-
lowing Clausewitz’s adage that “War is the continuation of politics 
by other means.” Considering that the actors who control the main 
networks of the grey economy in northern Mali currently all belong 
to armed signatories of the Algiers Accords, it is reasonable to ima-
gine that their economic positions will be safeguarded after the 
war72. Touching these trafficking networks would threaten the stabi-
lity and the tribal balances which are so sensitive in this area. If the 
demand remains the same, there is no reason to imagine that the 
supply will dry up as the production areas of products trafficked in 
northern Mali are numerous and hardly threatened: Latin America 
(cocaine), Morocco (hashish), Europe (medicinal drugs), or even in 
Asia and West Africa (methamphetamines). 
The role played by the grey economy in the rebel dynamics has a 
certain number of knock-on effects, including the mains ones being 
the worsening in inter-community relations and the fragmentation 
of the armed groups. This is fairly recent and related to the democra-
tisation and diversification of supply chains (particularly in drug pro-
ducts) enabling small groups to self-finance and therefore become 
autonomous73. The armed groups are therefore dealing with increa-
singly greater division, making the internal decision-making process 
in these groups more complex. 
extent oF the militant baSe 
The extent of the militant base partly depends on the ideological or 
external resources mobilised. The defence of self-determination, the spon-
sorship of foreign powers, the influx of Tuareg fighters from abroad, or the 
defence of economic interests are all factors for mobilising fighters. The 
existence of catalysts even feeds this ideological rhetoric more easily and 
72. Interview with the Secretary General of an armed group which is a signatory 
of the Algiers Accords, Bamako, May 2016.
73. Interview with a member of the CMA at the head of a group claiming such 
autonomy, Telephone interview, May 2016.
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mobilises an extended base. Furthermore, the extent of support could not 
be explained solely by these motivations. On the one hand, the decision to 
engage in or support a rebellion falls under the theory of rational choice. 
On the other hand, the extent of the base largely depends on the actual 
community inclusiveness of the armed group making this demand. 
The rebel image can be maintained permanently by the fighters for the 
political capital that it contains74, including among the established leaders 
in state institutions. The rebellion – at least an elastic term – can be pur-
sued from within. Effectively taking up arms, comes under personal and 
collective circumstantial calculations, whose specific feature in the Sahara 
(DEBOS, 2013) is that they are reversible75.
Being a rebel is not a transitory state in life, no more than a risky detour. 
It is an almost permanent commitment, which the Tuareg actors who are 
institutionally organised in Niger, like in Mali, claim to justify their conti-
nued rebel engagement from within. In other words, even an integrated 
nomad and apparently favourable to the state’s cause can decide to engage 
in rebellion.
Recent history is not lacking in novel personal trajectories of Tuaregs 
engaged at very high state institutional levels who sacrifice their career 
path (or hope to make it pick up) by joining the resistance movements. 
Hence, Aghaly Alambo who took over as head of the MNJ in 2007, when 
he was sub-prefect of Arlit. Hence, even Rhissa Ag Boula, at the root of 
the FLAA’s revival in 2004, after seven years spent as Minister of Tourism, 
doubtlessly was driven to join the front because of the arrest warrant 
against him. Thus, Ibrahim Mohamed Assaleh who launched the MNLA in 
2011 in Mali, when he was an elected member for the republic. Also, the 
same for Sheikh Ag Aoussa, who was deemed to be close to the Malian 
state security76, who followed Iyad Ag Ghaly to Ansar Dine in 2012. There 
are countless examples which bear witness to the extreme volatility of the 
74. To the point that meeting “false” rebels (who have never borne arms, but have 
sympathised with the cause) is common. The latter are nevertheless ridiculed by 
those who have actually experienced combat. See Frederic Deycard, op. cit., 2011.
75. This feature is a relative curiosity in the world of rebel movements. The Tuareg 
rebellions are far from being as rigorous as their Latin American or Asian counter-
parts in terms of controlling and sanctioning the back and forth of their members.
76. Interview with a Gendarme Commissioner originally from northern Mali, 
Nouakchott, March 2014.
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positioning and of alliances, whose drivers are generally far more compli-
cated than the superficial divide between state versus rebellion suggests. 
The violent engagements can be understood, as moments of renegotiating 
positions vis-à-vis the state or its community. They are temporary vehicles 
for personal or collective advancement projects which are more or less 
linked.
As an Arab in the Timbuktu region admitted in his interview, engage-
ment or not in a rebellion is subject to a rational risk/benefit analysis and 
is absolutely not dictated by membership or not of a state77. The example 
of the Lamhar Arabs, who are now officially in Mali’s peace camp (in the 
Platform) is illuminating. Initially supporting the MNLA in the 2011 rebel-
lion, they quickly withdrew, feeling that the group could not satisfy their 
interests, before allying with MUJAO and then returning to the side of the 
Malian state78. The idea of “patching up”, suggested by Yvan Guichaoua, 
to describe the Sahelian rebellions is proving to be appropriate. The MNJ 
in 2007, as well as the MNLA in 2011, are the result of composite and 
reversible alliances, of last-minute positioning, splits and late conversions. 
Above all, this patching-up depends on the context, the configuration of 
forces present, the opportunities and on the other hand the restrictions 
offered by rebel engagement. By aggregating very different actors and 
with only short-term interests in co-operating, as was the case with the 
last two rebellions in Niger and Mali, the dynamics of rebellion naturally 
formed quite often without planning or clear direction. 
The scale of the military base also stems from the community inclusive-
ness of the rebellion, namely the number of tribes or communities repre-
sented within it. The mobilised ideological resource is often not sufficient 
to explain the logics of violent action. It can conceal and co-exist with the 
internal logics of the groups which make it up. Some are just as ideolo-
gical, but they support a communitarian or tribal (more or less hidden) 
rather than a nationalist cause. More precisely, the rebellions initiated for 
nationalist motivations have always come up against inter-tribal rivalries 
around appropriation of the nationalist discourse by a community in order 
to appropriate the peace dividends. In short, sub-Azawad agendas are 
hidden behind the inclusive discourse of the rebel leaders, affecting the 
defence of a region or a tribe. The Malian rebellions in 1990 and 2011, 
77. Interview with an Arab originally from Timbuktu, Bamako, September 2013.
78. Interview with a Lamhar Arab from the Platform, Bamako, June 2016.
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both apparently inclusive and with a wide-ranging social base, were par-
tially infiltrated by the Ifoghas tribe supporting the defence of Kidal. It is 
the same for the 1990 rebellion in Niger, broken up into groups represen-
ting the different tribes, even if the fragmentation can be seen as a means 
of maximising the “peace dividends” as negotiations approach. 
Conversely, some rebel episodes did not manage to establish a very 
extensive social base, because it was clear that the engagement was made 
by a single tribal group for motivations which particularly concerned the 
aforesaid group and in which the other tribes were not sufficiently reflec-
ted in. This was the case for the ADC rebellion in 2006 in Mali, which 
from the start was driven by the Ifoghas in Kidal. Furthermore, this exa-
mple deserves some nuances, it being understood that the leader of this 
rebellion, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, remained the natural leader of the MNLA 
rebellion still in the making, until his death in August 2011. This para-
dox doubtlessly finds its explanation in the figure of Ag Bahanga, who is 
eminently respected for having been one of the only ones to never take 
up arms. His “charismatic authority” (WEBER, 2003) was able to transcend 
tribal allegiances. The case of Iyad Ag Ghaly, during the 1990 rebellion, 
could come under this form of transcendent authority. 
This volatility of trajectories and the existence of sub-nationalist inte-
rests constitute a permanent threat to challenging the state of peace 
because they make it more difficult to identify a point of consensus around 
which peace can be built. At the same time, it represents an opportunity 
for the states. Aware of the disparate nature of the factors of engagement, 
Mali and Niger are constantly seeking to weaken the groups internally as 
we will see later on. A constant feature of the Tuareg rebellions is the inter-
nal fragmentation which they suffer from, weakening the front, by opening 
up a negotiation/mediation process or by forming parastatal militias. In 
the long term, these divisive strategies nurture group resentment against 
each other, and create the conditions for future conflicts. 
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an attemPt at categoriSing logicS oF violent action in the context 
oF tuareg rebellionS in the Sahel
Although these resources of violent protest can explain, once com-
bined, the reasons for ongoing rebellions in completely different forms, 
each of these repertoires needs to be placed in the context of outbreak 
of rebellions. In accordance with the classification developed, the table 
below lists the catalysts for rebellions since 1916 and the extent of the 
social base of each one. 
Table 2: Nature of catalysts of the various rebellions and extent of their 
social base 
Catalysts for mobilisation Extent of 
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influence Ouillimiden 
(Mali) and Kel Aïr 
(Niger) 
- Senussist sup-








- Logic of raids
- Search for auto-
nomy in relation to 
the OCRS
- Governance by 
the independent 
Malian state 








Making Peace, Building the State
1990, 
Mali
- Legacy of 1963
- Fall of Moussa 
Traoré’s regime.
- Bad manage-
ment of the droughts 
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1980s (diversion of 
food aid) 
- Return of the 
Ishumar from Libya 
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(end of the Islamic 
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2007, 
Niger
- Food crisis in 
2005
- Delay in applying 
decentralisation




- Drug trafficking 
interests
- Defence of 
family interests 







of northern Mali 
(PSPSDN) and partial 
compliance of the 
Algiers Accords 
- Poor manage-
ment of the drought 
in 2009-2010
- Marginalisation 
of the Ifoghas in 
favour of the Imghad
- Marginalisation 
of the Tuaregs in 
favour of the Arabs
- Presence of 
AQMI
- Drug trafficking 
interests
- War in Libya











Changing mobilisation factors 
This table highlights the gradual change in factors that have been trig-
gering rebellions since 1916. Up until 1990, ideological mobilisation was 
seen as key through the continuing relationship of distrust between the 
Malian state and Tuareg communities since 1963, and the occurrence of 
the Tchintabaraden massacre which enabled the developing Nigerien rebel 
group in Libya to mobilise a very broad militant base. Exogenous catalysts 
existed since the mass departure of the Ishumar and the Tuareg fighters 
from Libya which was the driving force of both these rebellions. This deve-
lopment related to the Sahel’s geopolitics, and promoted by the migra-
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tions inherent to the nomadic identity of the Tuareg communities, was 
again decisive in 2012, since the war in Libya has been an accelerator or 
an amplifier of rebel engagement. However, like in 1990, there were many 
catalysts of an ideological nature on the eve of this rebellion, no doubt 
explaining, to a great extent, the scope of its militant base. The latest 
rebellions in Niger and in Mali have seen the emergence of two external 
dynamics:  the grey economy and terrorism. These two phenomena largely 
contribute to the “internationalisation of local conflicts” (BOILLEY, 2011).
Although, we have already shown to what extent these factors profoun-
dly changed the nature and economy of rebellions, it should be analysed 
how this impacts on the logics of peace consolidation and peacebuilding. 
In other words, if the factors for engaging in a rebellion evolve and become 
increasingly exogenous, the traditional responses of states to satisfy the 
motivations officially given by the armed groups are no longer enough. 
States acting on the ideological factors that they have made decisions on 
and the different peace accords concluded since 1990 in Niger and in Mali 
have always emphasised features responding to these factors through the 
“development – decentralisation – reintegration” triad. Yet, they have only 
partially adapted to the reality of a rebellion where the fighters’ motiva-
tions result more from geopolitical upheavals, community rivalries, sett-
ling of personal scores, drug-trafficking interests, and which were largely 
swallowed up by AQMI. Since this change in nature has not been taken into 
account, imagined solutions can only be inadequate and therefore fragile. 
Rebellions which were never totally put down
The state of peace does not exist strictly speaking in the Saharan-
Sahelian area. A quick retrospective looks at history shows, particularly 
for Mali, a continuous decrease in the interval between each of the rebel-
lions as indicated in the table. If the incidents related to rebellions, but 
which have not turned into rebellion are included (kidnapping of Malian 
officials by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga in 2001, revival of the FLAA in Niger in 
2004), the frequency is reduced even more to the extent that peace would 
appear more like a period of calm between two conflicting sequences. In 
times of war and peace, the dynamics are not fundamentally different. 
As Frédéric Deycard emphasises about Niger, “the ease in activating rebel 
movements, with all the constraints that this implies, proved the fluidity of 
status between ex-fighters and new rebels,” (DEYCARD, 2011). This holds 
true for Mali too. This ease of activation is due to the presence of armed 
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men, who, besides rebellion, are far from disarming, taking advantage 
of this military capital for various purposes: establishing private security 
companies (like Issyad Kato’s company SAGE in Agadez, or that of Ahmada 
Ag Bibi in Mali), re-entering the grey economy and banditry (road blocks). 
Some accumulation of this capital can even take place through these acti-
vities and therefore enable their actors to re-engage in the rebellion with 
more resources. This same holds true for the rebels who have been reinte-
grated within the army and for whom training supplied by the international 
co-operation forces (United States and France), as well as material dona-
tions are equally capital, in time mobilised in the context of a rebellion. 
Frédéric Deycard defends such a hypothesis regarding the reintegrated 
fighters in the Forces nationales d’intervention et de sécurité (FNIS), who a 
priori in a career path and having status, deserted in the early days of the 
MNJ rebellion, explaining that “in a way, their presence in the FNIS only 
represented a temporary situation and a form of legalising their normal 
rebel activity. The rebellions, before and after this interim period, appear 
as legitimations, vis-à-vis the community, with their military professiona-
lisation and their privileged status,” (DEYCARD, 2011). A fact under-esti-
mated by the author and that many interviews in Niger, as in Mali, allow 
us to support, is the social pressure which forces reintegrated fighters to 
desert. Not integrating in the rebellion is reverting to opposing it, there is 
no or little room for neutrality, a fortiori for the integrated rebels who may 
have to fight their former comrades in arms. This social pressure is not 
always experienced as a constraint and it can be galvanising and encourage 
actors to mobilise. During the MNJ rebellion, mobilisation out of a spirit of 
comradeship or brotherhood was noted, particularly for the neo-Ishumars. 
As part of our research on the 2011 Malian rebellion, the same determi-
nants were reported, including within Ansar Dine. In such a context of 
mobility between a state of war and of peace, beyond the response to the 
vested interests supported by the armed groups, the only way of restric-
ting the risk of turning to violent action is to satisfy the diffuse interests of 
the armed men who make them up. Yet, as we have shown in this chapter, 
the factors for changeover are many and not always easy for the states to 
counteract.
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iv – Peacemaking in mali and niger
It will be remembered from the preceding section that while rebellion 
is the expression of ideological demands through violence which the state 
must respond to with a view to moving towards peace, other considera-
tions must be taken into account and complexify the peace equation clai-
ming that the state must provide a response to each rebel demand. The 
interference of foreign actors, the interweaving of commercial issues in 
ideological motives, the sub-regional and inter-tribal rivalries considerably 
obscure the determinants of peace. This suggests a certain number of 
questions which this section seeks to answer. 
Is the search for peace the demonstration of structural characteristics 
or the fruit of an a priori more enlightened leadership in Niger than in 
Mali? Is the current peace in Niger, in particular, the result of plural and 
short-term strategies or of a considered and consistent process which is 
being consolidated over time? 
On the contrary, have the actions deployed by states to put down out-
breaks of rebellion created more tension than peace in the medium or 
long term? We are thinking here of the strategies deployed by both the 
Malian and Nigerien states, to instrumentalize inter-community tensions. 
Both countries have chosen to support the formation of community mili-
tias to weaken the rebellions at the risk of creating the same causes of 
future rebellions as was the case in Mali. Similarly, both countries have 
tried to make the rebel movements implode by negotiating with some lea-
ders. This strategy pays off in the short term, but deliberately ignores the 
structural background which armed protest capitalises on. 
To what extent is the attainment of peace dependent on exogenous fac-
tors and is it beyond the reach of the states involved? We will see here that 
the impact of the jihadist groups, the grey economy, but also the regional 
geopolitics considerably reduces the room for manoeuvre of these states, 
while questioning their responsibility as a sovereign state very directly. 
Indeed, these three exogenous factors are anchored in (more or less) fra-
gile states which are unable to control their entire territory. We will also 
see that on the contrary, states can use some of these exogenous factors to 
their advantage, particularly the grey economy in order to try to preserve 
peace. 
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Do the rebellions necessarily create endogenous mechanisms for 
controlling violence or settling conflicts? Matrimonial alliances, compen-
sation principles for damages suffered, and traditional religious authorities 
contribute to the arsenal of “common” measures which protagonists of 
conflicts use to control or stop violence and perhaps to seal more long-
term pacts of reciprocal solidarity.
We propose a simple classification summarised in the table below to 
facilitate the interpretation of and account for the wide range of practical 
tools activated in Mali and Niger to achieve peace. It seems to us particu-
larly necessary to highlight the importance of the unofficial peace mecha-
nisms, which are formidably effective, even if they have a limited impact 
over time. 
Table 3: Achieving peace 
Violent action Non-violent action
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In the face of the multi-faceted configurations observed in the previous 
section, the states of Mali and Niger used seemingly similar procedures to 
“make peace.” In this area, the processes are established in each of the 
states: use of armed force with a view to weakening the rebellion; starting 
a peace process to divide the rebellion from within; managing the peace 
process with actors involved in it; gradual imposition of this peace pro-
cess on all the rebel actors. The recent rebellions have been put down in 
this way, but this sequence is not exclusive, as indicated in Table 1 above. 
Indeed, the 1963 and 2007 rebellions were put down without a formal 
peace agreement. 
As discussed in the introduction, both states are struggling to convert 
the efforts at a ceasefire into a more ambitious stage of peacebuilding. 
Far from constituting a linear process, peacebuilding in Niger and Mali is 
fraught with crises (local, national, regional; climate, social, and safety), 
which correspond to moments of protest against so-called “hybrid” arran-
gements, which safeguard the peace with difficulty, without permanently 
building it. In short, war appears as an instrument for controlling disputes 
between the rebel actors and the state (including parastatal actors), which 
is seized, maintained, and dropped in particular circumstances and with 
specific resources (institutional and financial) (DEBOS, 2013) which is the 
real purpose of this research. Since these “hybrid” arrangements suit the 
warring parties, they are not encouraged to turn the ceasefire into a “posi-
tive peace”, specifically guaranteed by social justice, effective reconcilia-
tion, or even the provision of basic services by the state (GALTUNG, 1996).
Niger, despite everything, appears to be more advanced in this area, 
as we will see, through an integrated political framework and an innova-
tive tool for conflict prevention and controlling tension: the High Authority 
for the Consolidation of Peace. Nevertheless, short-termism dominates 
and violence has never been totally erased from the political arena. It is a 
persistent possibility, considered by the rebels and expected by the state, 
which seeks to prevent or contain it. The outbreak of violence admittedly 
represents a critical moment in political life, but it does not necessarily 
challenge the state’s survival. An exception to this model is perhaps, as dis-
cussed in the introduction, the Malian case in 2012, where the “technolo-
gical shock” of the Libyan collapse and AQMI’s involvement in the rebellion 
gave the rebels unprecedented fire power. However, even in this extreme 
case, it can be seen a posteriori that the political practices of the dominant 
elites have not been fundamentally revised and that President Amadou 
Toumani Touré’s criticised “consensual” management (BAUDAIS, CHAUZAL, 
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2006) is more or less replicated by his successor, with the approval of the 
country’s foreign protectors. 
Political integration: mali v niger
The political integration of the Tuareg communities in Niger is much 
more advanced than in Mali and for various reasons. One of these is 
geographical. The state of Niger is less divided geographically than Mali. 
Although this is well-known and can seem trivial, this fact has promoted 
exchanges (cultural, social, economic and political) between the north 
and south. The capital of northern Niger, Agadez, is easily accessible from 
Niamey, whereas Kidal, the centre of all rebellions since 1963 has remained 
extremely isolated. So, Agadez has for decades been a crossroads where 
northern and southern populations mix (SALIFOU, 1993), including from a 
regional point of view (BENSAAD, 2003). The ancient existence of the trade 
routes between Agadez, Niamey and Zinder was a determinant for inclu-
ding the north in the national economy. Emmanuel Grégoire (2011) main-
tains that the population of Agadez was mainly Hausa in the 1990s. On the 
other hand, northern Mali is not structurally integrated in trade networks 
with its south. The case of Kidal is an extreme, just like this region, some-
times considered as the Algerian “last wilaya79” (province), only breathing 
through Algeria. More than half of the Kidalois population has Algerian 
nationality. 
These mixtures, in Niger, are reflected by marriages which as a mini-
mum forge effective channels of communication, or even interdepen-
dencies which prevent the risk of a conflict. The Nigerien populations are 
much more mixed than in Mali, whether between the so-called northern 
and southern populations, but also between the different northern tribes. 
The north-south mix, protected by marriage, is a reality which no longer 
surprises anyone in Niger to such a point that it is ignored in most of the 
analyses. From the lowest to the highest level of the state, it is not unusual 
for political actors or operators to have at least one Tuareg among their 
wives. This has helped to soften the north-south community polarisations. 
Once again, the situation is quite different in Mali. Even within the nor-
thern tribes, the feeling of caste and tribal differentiation does not form a 
barrier in Niger, and it is very uncommon to see Imghads marrying Ifoghas, 
79. The wilaya is the base unit of local authority in Algeria. The country has 48. 
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which is an almost non-existent situation in Mali. Moreover, although the 
sedentary Songhai and Fulani populations are in the majority in the river 
regions, they are largely a minority north of the river, encouraging an iden-
tity divide since 1960. 
Beyond these structural factors which have been converted into effec-
tive social interactions, Niger is often cited as an example for its system 
of integration and political representation of the “Tuareg minorities” 
(PEZARD, 2014), and more broadly speaking, of nomadic minorities. This 
is partly due to how Nigerien political life functions, informally structured 
around ethno-regional political compositions (Hausa, Songhai-Zarma). In 
Mali, the political arena thrives more on relations between the centre and 
the peripheries, a context of north-south polarisation conducive to the 
development of irredentist demands.
Also in Mali, community loyalties are declared, made public and clai-
med. Tribalizing the political arena is, on the contrary, a serious accusation 
in the Nigerien political arena and an attack on republican impartiality. 
During the last presidential campaign (2015-16) each camp was further-
more accused of doing so and putting the national unity at risk80. Tribalism 
is disqualifying in government, even though finely-tuned ethnic combina-
tions chair the formation of governments and cabinets behind the scenes. 
The only reported “ethnic entrepreneurs” in Niger are the Tuareg acti-
vists81. The ethnic demand is however fully integrated into the Malian poli-
tical arena. 
Besides this inclusive dimension of the political arena, Niger also spe-
cifically opted for a policy of promoting minorities, at least at community 
representative level. Since the end of the first rebellion, the integration 
of some cadres to strategic posts was supposed to block the process for 
triggering rebellions with the main commanders having been appointed to 
strategic posts to neutralise the risk that the single appointment of one or 
another may create resentment: Mohamed Anacko as High Representative 
for the Consolidation of Peace and Rhissa Ag Boula as Minister of Tourism. 
The appointment strategies which are not part of any legal quota framework 
80. This was particularly salient on the day after the foiled coup and the electoral 
debates in Niger in late 2015 and the start of 2016. 
81. The interpretations of this paragraph are from an interview with a leading 
university academic in Niamey (June 2016).
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only have a limited influence, but they temporarily help to achieve social 
peace, and Niger with the appointment of Brigi Rafini as Prime Minister 
in 2011, has extended this process to disproportionate scales. Several 
hundred officers and advisors indeed work in the prime minister’s office 
nowadays, similarly in the presidency, the National Assembly or even the 
HACP82. This network is made up of nomadic elites, sorted within each 
tribe and civil society body so that their co-optation is sufficient to temper 
the elements favourable to rebellion83.
This strategy has been very openly thought through and implemented 
to deal with the Libyan crisis, and successfully, even though Niger is still 
naturally more exposed than Mali to influences from Libya, which it shares 
a border with84. In 2014, when the closure of Imouraren made hundreds 
of young people (many of whom were former rebels) unemployed85, the 
HACP (with other Nigerien actors) used this strategy once again. This sys-
tem of co-optation, although expensive, also has the advantage of pro-
moting the circulation of information and intelligence helping to build up 
a social and safety network which is often combined with intermarriages. 
This Nigerien integration system goes further. Its strength lies in its 
capacity for extension, so that actors with objective reasons to protest 
against the current regime paradoxically belong to it. The reason for this 
is certainly due to access to state (and international) revenue channels, 
almost always entirely reserved for actors of this informal network86. This 
network, which has branched out to networks of power, channels the 
temptations of some figures for political and economic emancipation. 
82. Interviews with several members of this network, Niamey, May 2016. The logic 
of the HACP is explicitly based on local community intermediaries, citizens of mu-
nicipalities considered “at risk”, paid by the institution, responsible for monitoring 
possible local tensions and relaying the information back to Niamey (interview 
with Colonel-Major Abou Tarka, Chair of the HACP, Niamey, June 2016).
83. Interview with a presidential advisor, Niamey, May 2016.
84. Other considerations somewhat reduce the role of the HACP in managing the 
return flows from Libya. One of them is the main armed organisation from Libya 
of the Malian Colonel Mohamed Najim with his men.
85. Ibid.
86. Interview with an economic operator belonging to this group, Niamey, May 
2016.
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At civil society level, when an identity and protest movement is born 
in the north of the country, it is nipped in the bud precisely by these for-
mer figures integrated in the regime. During the establishment of the CRI 
initiated by several youngsters originally from the Agadez region (inclu-
ding many ex-MNJ fighters), the state apparatus and its affiliates in Agadez 
(particularly the mayor Rhissa Feltou) worked successfully to contain the 
organisation (see the box below). The reasons are doubtlessly due to the 
identity of some of the CRI’s leaders as much as the vindictiveness of the 
organisation. This case illustrates the regime’s fear of allowing the Tuareg 
cause be discussed outside of state intermediaries, its responsiveness and 
its resources to channel disputes in the making. 
Putting aside this control of dissenting voices, the state also maintains 
order by distributing revenue through various more or less official chan-
nels. The prime minister’s office is one of the main channels, where several 
hundred Tuareg officials and advisors are financed87. The community chan-
nels are used for this purpose. Most of the Tuaregs engaged in community 
activities are dependent on state remittances, whether they are traditio-
nal civil society actors like Mano Aghaly, until recently Minister of Health, 
but behind the foundation of the NGO Thamed, or former rebels like 
Mohamed Ajidar and Ahmed Oaghaya at the head of the NGO Croisade. 
All are in the government’s sphere of influence, a means for the state to 
ensure minimum loyalty. 
Finally, the economic and commercial channels are mobilised in 
that respect, through the award of public contracts or sub-contracting 
contracts. Sharif Ghabidine88, who died at the start of 2016, had establi-
shed himself as the preferred beneficiary of public contracts in the Agadez 
region and maintained many former rebels, employed directly or in a capa-
city of providing sub-contracting contracts89. This leads to contradictory 
configurations where the actors, who do no conceal their hostility towards 
the central government, work for one of the leading barons of the present 
regime. 
87. Interview with an advisor to the prime minister’s office, Niamey, May 2016. 
88. Sharif Ghabidine was an Arab economic operator from Niger. He was also the 
elected member for Agadez and remained until his death the main financier for 
the party in power, the PNDS. 
89. Interview with several prominent figures in Agadez, January 2016. 
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These revenue allocation mechanisms therefore help to integrate actors 
potentially hostile to the state and to gain their loyalty in the short term, 
without guaranteeing their integration into society and Nigerien political 
life in the long term, or convincing them to permanently give up the armed 
struggle. The inherent limitation of this model is that it mainly relies on 
fragile financial revenue. On the one hand, partly as a result of internatio-
nal aid, this revenue is not therefore fully controlled by the Nigerien state. 
On the other hand, the availability of this revenue depends on the state’s 
financial situation, which is weaker today90. The suspension, announced 
by the President, of all of the advisors who form a significant part of this 
network reflects the limitations of this expensive system, with the govern-
ment betting on the fact that the gold boom dampens the shock generated 
by the suspension of wages, on average in the region of 300 000 FCFA per 
advisor91.
CRI – MNA: same struggle in different forms?
In January 2014, a Nigerien civil society movement emerged in 
Agadez: the Collective for Renewal and Innovation (CRI). This movement, 
made up of young people, mainly originally from Agadez, is presented 
as “a collective of organisations committed to the struggle to improve 
the population’s living conditions and in strict compliance with the laws 
of the Republic. ” Vindictive in its positions (particularly against the lack 
of benefits from mining at Agadez), the movement mobilised the sons 
of former rebels (including its Secretary-General El Kontchi Mohamed 
Aoutchiki), and organised demonstrations until the different channels 
going to central government were mobilised to curb its enthusiasm: with 
a ban on demonstrations by the CIR announced by the Mayor of Agadez 
, due to a lack of document provided for him to recognise the organisa-
tion’s status. This ban would have provoked the anger of some of the 
CRI’s youth, who would have been restored to calm in the night through 
the regional council’s president’s networks at the request of the central 
government in Niamey. 10 CRI members, including the Co-ordination, 
90. See for example “Niger: les comptes publics dans le rouge”, Africa Intelligence, 
19 July 2016.
91. Interview with an advisor to the prime minister, Niamey, May 2016.
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Rachid Kollo, were also imprisoned in February 2014 for having orga-
nised an unauthorised demonstration. Yet, the CRI youth have never 
turned to violence, due to the efforts of multiple intermediaries who are 
busy without stint to speak equally to the young as well as the state party, 
obtaining concessions from both sides. This approach seems typical of 
the effective Nigerien mechanisms for preventing a violent escalation. 
The fate of the CRI provides a striking contrast with that of the MNA, 
its Malian counterpart created in November 2010 by several young 
people from different regions of Mali. The purpose is not far removed 
from that of the CRI, if you believe its foundation statement: “To defend 
and promote a peaceful policy, in order to achieve the legitimate objec-
tives and to recover all the historic rights stolen from the Azawad people 
in their diversity,” by “condemning violence and terrorism in all their 
forms .” Although the MNA was not hindered at the outset, even being 
permitted to organise its Congress in Timbuktu, the imprisonment of 
two of its leaders, including Moussa Ag Acharatoumane following this 
Congress (for suspected car thefts), had the effect of radicalising the 
movement which, with the combination of other rebel forces and tribes 
(notably the Ifoghas) would become the MNLA a year later. In Niger, the 
imprisonment of the young protesters was the climax of the crisis, trig-
gering initiatives on both sides towards appeasement. In Mali, the impri-
sonment of the MNA leaders, which was immediately mobilised through 
social media, was presented by their sympathisers as a sign of impossibi-
lity of dialogue with the state.
This difference in trajectories can be explained, among other causes 
by the absence of actors who can be activated by the Malian government 
to discourage this spirited youth. However, this is partly due to the fact 
that in 2010, the dynamics at work were already conducive to preparing 
an armed movement, which was probably not the case in early 2014 in 
Niger. 
Mali also has made efforts in terms of political integration. This includes 
the appointment of the Tuareg Prime Minister, Ag Hamani in 2002, 
while former commanders were appointed to strategic posts: Zeidan Ag 
Sidilamine, or even Iyad Ag Ghaly, who was appointed advisor to the presi-
dency of the republic in 2007. 
However, the rebels’ bases’ reaction to these appointments seem to 
differ in both countries. They can alternatively be regarded as betrayals 
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or victories of the cause. Both discourses co-exist in both countries, but 
the repertoire for discrediting leaders absorbed by the state is doubtlessly 
more open in Mali92. A hypothesis is that the respective bases of the lea-
ders are more polarised in Mali than in Niger, each co-optation of a leader 
causing resentment among those who no longer recognise them. A second 
hypothesis is due to the lower capacity of rebel movements to create new 
leaders in Niger: very few new protest figures have emerged in Niger after 
the MNJ leaders were absorbed by the state. Now, these leaders are key 
figures (they are always “ahead”) despite the criticisms against them from 
the young Tuareg activists. In Mali, on the contrary, the MNA represented 
a pool of young charismatic militants who partly relegated the old rebel 
guard and survived the early disappearance of the leader who they trusted 
the most, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga.
the uSe oF armed deterrence
The use of force by the Malian and Nigerien military has often been 
among the components which have fuelled rebellion in these coun-
tries’ history, whether it be in Niger, with the events already discussed 
in Tchintabaraden, or in Mali, with the repression of the first incidents in 
1963, previously discussed, or the occupation of Tinzawaten in September 
2007, provoking the resumption of hostilities by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. What 
is at issue here is not the problem of use of force as such, but the fact that 
this use often has been the opportunity for atrocities on the civilian popu-
lations. The armies, particularly the Malian one since 1963, are associated 
with this image, and it is very difficult for them to redeploy in the north, 
without this perspective alone being a reason for armed engagement. So, 
the only construction of military barracks as part of the PSPSDN from 2009 
in the north of the country incurred the wrath of many Tuaregs in Mali93.
However, once the rebellion has broken out, use of force – or the threat 
of using force – can prove to be a strong deterrent when the rebels’ enga-
92. This suggestion is not scientific, but is based on regular visits for many years by 
the authors of this report to social media supporting Tuareg causes respectively 
in Mali and Niger. 
93. Besides the fact that this construction was part of the objections voiced by 
the MNLA, many interviews with civilians confirmed this sentiment. See also Ag 
Youssouf and al., 2012.
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gement is based on weak motivations or built on a coalition of different 
interests. So, among the causes for the Nigerien demobilisation in 2009, 
the deployment of two MI25 helicopters by the Nigerien armed forces 
against the MNJ was, according to the testimonies of the MNJ fighters, 
the determinant (GUICHAOUA, 2011). Against a background of conflicts 
between the movement’s leaders and the base and a challenge to the lea-
ders’ real motivations, these strikes discouraged the aforementioned base 
from pursuing a fight which was not worth the effort. This feeling, which 
was very current in the fighting ranks of the MNJ, is still firmly ingrained 
nowadays94, with some ex-fighters saying that they realised that the cause 
was not genuinely supported enough to risk their lives. For other Nigerien 
ex-fighters we met, this Nigerien military pressures and the now proven 
risk of strikes by the armed forces in the Aïr mountains simply changed 
how they thought about the rebellion. One of them said along these lines: 
“The young people of Aïr will never initiate a rebellion from the mountains 
to get shot from above. If there is a rebellion, it will be in the cities, where 
the rebels will be protected from air strikes. The young people have held 
meetings to discuss this95.”
Since the end of the MNJ, this armed deterrence has even been 
reinforced by the US and French military presence which is an essential 
parameter in the risk/benefit analysis. A former rebel leader questioned 
on this subject agrees: “No rebellion which is not supported by the French 
or the Americans will not work, it would be suicide96.” There is little doubt 
that if the Nigerien regime called on this western armed presence to fight 
against terrorism, it is also counting on it to discourage potential rebels 
from taking action97.
No doubt drawing on the lessons of the success of the MI25, President 
Amadou Toumani Touré also called on eastern European pilots in January 
2011 to support his scarce airborne resources, but the scale of the mili-
tant base was such and the military resources committed by the MNLA 
and Ansar Dine (due to the support of AQMI) made the threat of armed 
deterrence futile. The engagement of armed militias made up of fighters 
94. Many interviews conducted at Agadez in January 2016 confirm this impres-
sion. 
95. Interview with an ex-MNJ fighter, Agadez, January 2016
96. Ibid.
97. Interview with a presidential advisor in Niger, Niamey, May 2016.
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originally from the north also plays a part in this logic of using force, reflec-
ting the powerlessness of the regular armed forces. 
inStitutional reSPonSeS: old remedieS and State innovation 
The repeated call for decentralisation.
The issue of decentralisation, in Niger like in Mali, is long-standing and 
largely preceded the rebellions. However, the decentralisation process has 
always had its greatest advances (nationally) as a result of rebellions. So, 
the peace accords of the 1990 rebellions endorsed the idea of “decentra-
lisation” for Niger (Ouagadougou Accord in 1995) and of “special status” 
for Mali (National Pact in 1992) in response to the nationalist demands 
voiced by the armed rebel groups. Similarly, the 2006 Algiers Accord in 
Mali strongly emphasises increasing decentralisation, particularly by cal-
ling for increased skills transfers and support for regionalisation in Kidal. 
Although the lack of a peace accord following the 2007 rebellion in Niger 
makes it more difficult to assess the place of decentralisation in achieving 
peace, the adoption of the regionalisation law in 2008 seems to respond 
to the MNJ’s action. Finally, the regionalisation process is at the heart of 
the Algiers Accords that were supposed to end the 2012 rebellion in Mali. 
Therefore, decentralisation has quite logically been the most direct res-
ponse to the demands for autonomy by the various rebel armed groups 
since 1990. 
The demands in terms of decentralisation come from three dimensions: 
the search for autonomy in local public policy (access to public resources, 
development of direct co-operation with sponsors without going through 
central government); the search for partial ownership of primary materials 
located in the north; the search for elected posts to increase communities’ 
national representation. 
The trajectories of both states show fairly similar commitments in terms 
of decentralisation: the communalisation phase (1998 in Mali and 2004 in 
Niger) in the aftermath of the “great rebellions” of 1990, and then a shift 
towards regionalisation (2011 in Niger and to come in Mali). Paradoxically, 
for a long time Niger has been accused of lagging behind compared to Mali 
(OLIVIER DE SARDAN, 2006). The commitment of Alpha Oumar Konaré and 
Ousmane Sy’s team has indeed ranked Mali among the leading countries 
in terms of communalisation since 1993, while the process has lagged 
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behind a lot in Niger. Subsequently, Niger has caught up to the point of 
leading the way through a regionalisation process which has effectively 
given rise to elected regional councils since 2011. However, in fact, Mali 
like Niger suffers from the same problems in terms of decentralisation: low 
resource mobilisation, limited skills transfers, financial under-funding of 
local authorities (PELLERIN, 2015; MARTE, 2012). Both countries are expe-
riencing a “double effectiveness” (MARTE, 2012), that is effective legally, 
but very relative in practice mainly because of the states’ inaction. Niger 
has not been left behind from this point of view. Although the decision to 
amend the mining code in 2013 to ensure a handover of 15 % of mining 
revenue to the local authorities generated enthusiasm (PEZARD, 2015), in 
actual fact, the promised revenue was not handed over98. When you consi-
der that the redistribution of uranium revenues was at the heart of the 
MNJ’s demands, this is likely to relativize the effectiveness of decentralisa-
tion in perspective in terms of peace consolidation. 
The effectiveness of the link between decentralisation and peace remains 
in question and would merit a specific study of this subject. Although the 
process allows for the legitimate emergence (with the population’s bles-
sing) of former rebel leaders to positions of responsibility (cases abound in 
Niger, like Mohamed Anacko, President of the Regional Council of Agadez), 
this process can also be a source of conflict. Herein is perhaps the diffe-
rence between Niger and Mali. In Mali, like in many respects, decentrali-
sation has sharpened inter-community tensions: demand by force for the 
establishment of a municipality (Ibrahmin Ag Bahanga in 1999); inter-com-
munity tensions around the awarding of public contracts; intra-tribal 
rivalries (Kel Adagh in 1999 in Kidal), intertribal rivalries (between Ifoghas 
and Imghad during the municipal elections in 2009), and inter-community 
rivalries (between Arabs and Tuaregs during the parliamentary elections 
in 2007). The latter rivalries certainly fuelled the dynamics of rebel enga-
gement in 2011. In Niger, although the rivalries between the traditional 
authorities and the local authorities are known, decentralisation has not 
caused so much tension, although rivalries between networks may exist 
as demonstrated over the past two years by the attempts to disqualify the 
Mayor of Iferouane or the President of the Regional Council of Agadez99. 
In short, it appears that decentralisation can aggravate fault lines, particu-
98. Interview with a ROTAB (Network of Organisations for Transparency and Bud-
getary Analysis) official, Niamey, May 2016.
99. Interview with an elected representative for Agadez, Agadez, January 2016.
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larly pre-existing community ones. Again, the lower polarisation of tribal 
identities in Niger partially protects the country from these risks. 
HACP: is it an innovative institution?
In some respects, Niger has begun a peacebuilding phase, with the 
HACP being the favoured institutional frame for peace consolidation. Its 
operation has changed little since 1995 when the High Commission for the 
Restoration of Peace was created as a tool to implement the post-rebellion 
peace accord. Its presidency, entrusted to Mohamed Anacko, the last rebel 
to have signed the accord, constituted a guarantee to include the latter in 
the decision-making process. The MNJ rebellion in 2007 forced the autho-
rities to renew this tool by renaming it the High Authority for National 
Reconciliation and Democratic Consolidation in 2010, before it became the 
High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace in 2011. Since 2010, it is 
significant that two military personnel have succeeded each other as the 
head of the institution, in the person of Colonel Lawal Chekou Koré, a Tubu 
figure who would become head of the DGDSE, and then Colonel Abou 
Tarka. This could indicate a change in approach against the MNJ begun in 
2009, namely a firm stance with regard to areas considered “fragile” by the 
HACP. The HACP is therefore the institutional common link which connects 
the 1990 peace process to nowadays, with the bonus of unprecedented 
activism, the HACP surpasses the role which was originally granted to it 
to be involved in all the issues likely to weaken the Nigerien state in Diffa, 
Tillabery or in Agadez100. In this sense, the High Authority is redefining its 
role in the light of the security and political priorities facing Niger. 
The political support enjoyed by the HACP at the highest level (presi-
dency) is one of its strengths, unlike Mali where the issue of peacebuilding 
has never been the subject of strong and long-term political support, inclu-
ding the components of the process such as decentralisation. This support 
for the HACP is also not without creating jealousies within the state appa-
ratus, some deeming that the institution is nibbling away at some sove-
reign ministries and absorbing the SDS (Strategy for Development in the 
Sahel). Established as an essential partner for international sponsors in the 
(very large and expandable over and over again) peace area in Niger, the 
HACP has become the one-stop-shop for those who aspire to benefit from 
international assistance, foremost among them are the former rebels. By 
100. Interview with Abou Tarka, Niamey, May 2016. 
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sprinkling a number of small project for the benefit of local actors who 
count and who must be satisfied, the HACP is making itself indispensable 
to the latter, and is creating a large network of more or less compelled 
informers, who are of great use to the state in terms of national security101. 
It is both a chamber for recording security alerts and a fund for controlling 
tension, intervening in “all four corners of the country” as soon as tension 
emerges. Its leader, Abou Tarka, however does not make it the ultimate 
tool in conflict resolution, but he sees it as an instrument helping “to win 
hearts and minds102.” This is, perhaps, the limitation of the HACP in terms 
of peacebuilding. 
The HACP has achieved a subtle balance. Aside from its role in early 
warning and crisis management, the institution plays an important role in 
social peace. It is still the symbol of the peace caravans which continue to 
go across northern Niger to spread a message of peace and to ensure that 
it is actually understood by all, in transit consistently contributing to leaving 
the Nigerien state’s stamp on the most remote areas of the country103. It is 
significant that the HACP also obliges foreign donors to maintain a leading 
role in projects funded by them. Here again, the concern is to assert the 
state’s presence to prevent its absence from being perceived as weakness 
by entrepreneurs of instability. Its financial dependence on foreign donors 
is doubtlessly its main weakness. 
Unlike Niger, Mali does not have any similar organisation which has been 
working for peace consolidation continually since 1990, even less since 
1963. The Northern Commission, which was created specifically to imple-
ment the National Pact, as well as the ADN (Northern Mali Development 
Agency) could have incorporated into similar instruments, if they had not 
lost their legitimacy with the appointment at their head of actors who 
suffered from a lack of inclusiveness, since they belonged to the Imghad 
community. Furthermore, Niger’s ambition to distance itself from these 
institutions very marked by community bias seemed clear if Abdoul Karim 
Saidou is to be believed: “Refusing to follow the Malian example where 
the 1992 National Pact established a Northern Commission, the (Nigerien) 
Government did not intend to make the HCRP (High Commission for the 
Restoration of Peace) an institution for the benefit of an ethnic group or a 
101. Ibid.
102. Interview with Abou Tarka, Niamey, June 2016. 
103. Interview with Abou Tarka, Niamey, May 2016. 
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specific region” (ABDOUL KARIM SAIDOU, 2009). Again, the same obser-
vation can be established as that made regarding the integration process. 
As part of a peacemaking process complicated by and interspersed with 
inter-community rivalries, under-representing some of these communities 
at the head of institutions responsible for implementing the peace accord 
can only threaten this process. 
militiaS and diviSionS to Weaken 
The rebellions in Niger and in Mali have been largely destroyed or put 
down because of internal divisions, which are reflections of the disorderly 
mobilisation processes mentioned earlier. None have escaped this rule, 
with the exception perhaps of the 2006 Malian rebellion, which was lar-
gely concentrated in Kidal and whose dissent could have been feigned by 
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga to retain an active rebel location in the event that the 
peace would not provide a satisfactory outcome for the Kidalois popula-
tions104.
These divisions are not only the result of the composite dimension 
of the rebellions. They have often been encouraged by the Nigerien and 
Malian states, which is a proven strategy in other contexts, including Chad 
(DEBOS, 2013). Some Nigerien observers mention the role played by the 
state in the creation of the FPN and the FFR, through Rhissa Ag Boula, 
in order to weaken the MNJ in 2008 and 2009105. In the 1990 and 2006 
Malian rebellions, the Malian state managed, with the support of Algeria, 
to divide the rebel groups by relying on certain key actors, particularly Iyad 
Ag Ghaly, but also Zeidan Ag Sidilamine. These short-term strategies fuelled 
inter-community rivalries, sowing the seeds for future rebellions. So, we 
can discuss the cross-instrumentalisation of the Imghads and Ifoghas by 
the Malian state, playing on their ancient historical status rivalries106. The 
104. Interview with someone close to Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, Bamako, November 
2015.
105. Interviews with several actors in the Nigerien rebellion, Niamey, May 2016. 
106.  In the pre-colonial status order, the Imghads are the subjects of noble 
groups, which the Ifoghas are part of. Decolonisation and the egalitarian socialist 
project of the first Malian President, Modibo Keita, have de facto undermined (but 
not totally destroyed) this order. The chieftanship and the traditional hierarchies, 
synonymous with slavery, no longer had a home in independent Mali (Cf. Pierre 
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support given to General Gamou and the Imghads to the detriment of the 
Ifoghas of Kidal, hence was a motive for rebellion in both 2006 and 2011. 
More precisely, it should be analysed if the Nigerien state’s instrumentali-
sations have historically produced similar results. 
These strategies are not restricted to dividing the rebel movements 
from within by promoting one or several actors from within it. They are 
also reflected by the forms of material support for the establishment or the 
maintenance of rival community movements (like in Niger in 2007) which 
serve to break the armed group’s propaganda, and especially by suppor-
ting the creation of civil militias. The case for the Imghad and Arab militias 
formed by President ATT to break Ibrahim Ag Bahanga’s rebellion in 2008 
and 2009, but also unofficially to regain control of the trafficking routes, is 
questioned here107. The same strategy was reproduced by the new Malian 
authorities through support for the establishment of GATIA (Imghad and 
Allies Tuareg Self-Defence Group) and the Lamhar Arab militias in 2015. 
The formation of self-defence militias is far from being specific to Mali. 
Although it is less known, Niger has not been left behind from this point 
of view. Indeed, the Tuareg and Tubu rebellions in 1991 led to the spread 
of Self-Defence Movements in the Fulani and Arab communities. Hence 
the emergence in Manga of the Fulani militia in Diffa and the Arab militia 
in N’Guigmi. In Azawak, two Arab militias operated in the Tassara area, the 
Self-Defence Committee (CAD) and the Tassara Vigilance Committee (CVT). 
According to Emmanuel Grégoire, these foundations received the approval 
of Prime Minister Amadou Cheffou (GREGOIRE, 2010 p 58). However, this 
support for training civilians did not produce the disastrous consequences 
as in Mali. Several explanations may be invoked to explain these diffe-
rences: tribal polarisations are less in Niger and therefore resentments fol-
lowing inter-community clashes are reduced; considering that the Tassara 
militias have been officially dissolved, it can be assumed that the Nigerien 
state is not embroiled in relations of interdependence with these paras-
tatal actors, but is detached from them or uses them for other purposes 
once peace has been achieved; the escalation of violence is probably bet-
Boilley, op. cit., 1999). The rhetoric of the feudal and slavery-ridden north is still a 
vivid driver in the state’s counter-propaganda in the face of rebellions. 
107. For example, a Wikileaks cable refers to the involvement of an important 
Berabiche officer in drug trafficking. 
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ter anticipated and defused by the mobilisation of a large network of infor-
mers and mediators. 
The tendency of post-colonial authorities to rely on parastatal actors, 
as a way of managing power is far from being innovative. The colonial 
authorities often used these modalities for managing power due to a 
lack of resources or willingness (HERBST, 2000). Such configurations pre-
vailed particularly in the Saharan-Sahelian area, the extent of which made 
managing the territory expensive in terms of human resources. Support 
for local actors – colonial intermediaries (including the figure of the gou-
mier) – formed an important means of ensuring indirect rule here, to the 
point of interfering in tribal successions. It was frequently combined with 
community instrumentalisation issues and the colonial authorities suppor-
ting some tribes to weaken their neighbours. The case of the Ifoghas, an 
intermediary for the colonial authorities in the Adrar mountains and who 
even fought the Ouillimiden rebels, is well documented (BOILLEY, 2012, 
p 94-95). In Aïr, colonial authority relied on the Kel Ewey. This resulted 
in major clashes between this tribe and the resistance groups in Kaocen 
(DEYCARD, 2011).
However, nowadays these strategies for controlling order in the Sahara 
by a parastatal force are no longer sufficient. Although they allow the rebel 
movements to be weakened, as was the case with the Arab and Imghad 
militias which coped with Ibrahim Ag Bahanga in 2008, they cannot ensure 
controlled order against a background of the disappearance of the large tri-
bal confederations (PEZARD & SHURKIN, 2015). The dispersal of the Malian 
tribes, which has been ongoing since the start of the 2000s, because of “the 
empowerment” of new families enriched by the grey economy, reinforces 
this underlying trend. This grey economy (which often justifies possession 
of a weapon), combined with the subsequent rebellions since 1990, has 
made access to weapons widespread to all groups, depriving one tribe of 
the ability to ensure a “hegemonic stability” (KINDLEBERGER, 1973). As we 
will see in the following section, this “hegemonic stability” may however 
be guaranteed by the networks. 
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the grey economy aS an integration Factor and Social SaFety 
valve?
The grey economy constitutes a “pharmacon phenomenon”, both a 
poison and a remedy108. Undeniably, it is a means of spreading, or even of 
triggering the rebellion, as we have already shown. On the other hand, a 
careful interpretation of the current Nigerien situations obliges us to rela-
tivize its only aggressive dimension. Indeed, the grey economy can be seen 
as one of the factors for the current relative stability in northern Niger.
This activity employs several hundred young ex-rebels who have never 
been reintegrated or rehabilitated, whose only capital is to exploit the use 
of weapons and to control the Saharan routes (as declining tourism is no 
longer a viable option). It also forms a social safety valve; however, it is 
capable of turning into armed violence as we have seen in Mali during 
the 2000s. The integrating virtues of the grey economy are due to the 
structuring of its networks. When it is an issue of rivalries between state 
networks and independent networks even related to former rebels, it can 
be a driver of conflict, as the case of the 2011 Malian rebellion has very 
clearly shown (LACHER, 2012). On the contrary, the grey economy beco-
mes a producer of integration since its networks are controlled by one or 
more men belonging to the group in power making this grey economy a 
mechanism for state building (BAYART et al, 1997). This being understood 
as a “rhizome state” (BAYART, 1989), whose grey economy is an important 
sector. Since these networks are sufficiently powerful to channel, or even 
neutralise the involvement of independent actors in the grey economy, 
the latter becomes an integrator. This is the configuration which widely 
predominates in Niger now. Powerful actors who have benefited from this 
Nigerien integration system have succeeded in imposing a quasi-monopo-
listic situation, enabling them to recruit within all the communities (Arabs, 
Tuaregs, Tubus) to neutralise the risk of community polarisation. These 
actors, who themselves branch out from the integration system, there-
fore have no objective reason to seek to challenge it, which reinforces the 
regime’s stability. That is not to say, that there is no competing network in 
Niger, the roadblocks are fairly frequent from this point of view, but that 
these few independent networks are too isolated to constitute a spark of 
rebellion. Herein lies the entire difference with Mali, where the rebellion 
108. This image is taken from researcher Reda Benkirane as part of studies which 
have not been published yet. 
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was broadly favoured by the rivalry between drug-trafficking groups and 
originally of an inter-community nature. Since the Malian state chose to 
support some groups in 2008 and to turn them into militias, this can only 
exacerbate the tensions between communities. 
This situation is of course not a typical ideal to be achieved, being essen-
tially fragile and risky, but is an objective fact, built to suit the penetration 
of this lucrative business in the Saharan economy, and that the states were 
not able to or did not want to curb. This reality must be considered to 
explain how peace is ensured, including when it is a social peace that is 
largely bought and precarious. It fragility is intrinsically due to the fact that 
the grey economy, whether smuggling or trafficking, is a cross-border acti-
vity whose determinants escape national and local actors. So, to take just 
one example, the closure of the Algerian border following the outbreak 
of Operation Serval has drastically curbed the used car trade between 
Tamanrasset and Agadez, creating several hundred (young) unemployed 
in the latter city109.
The two configurations which exist in Mali and Niger are both risky: 
that the state networks are no longer essential to the operation of the 
grey economy and also that its actors are independent of it. The risk to 
Mali would no longer be only seeing rival groups return to confrontation 
(currently CMA against the Platform), but that all the armed groups in the 
north agree on a modus operandi which excludes the state from this grey 
economy. Objectively, the networks of the grey economy in northern Mali 
no longer have any reason (administratively, logistically, security) to rely 
on the state networks (information services and security forces) given that 
the armed groups almost completely control the north. In Niger, the risk 
focuses on the fact that the dominant network is weakening, either through 
the attrition on the current government, or through the network’s failure 
which would result in its decline. This would contribute to the emergence 
of independent networks capable of destabilising the precarious balance 
found by Niger. 
This grey economy is becoming crucial in the dynamics of peacebuilding 
and peace consolidation. It is a starting point for crises, as we have seen, 
but also an arrival point for them, from this point of view representing a 
challenge for international peace engineers not familiar with taking the 
criminal economy into account in peace dynamics. The crisis and recovery 
109. Interview with several former used car dealers, Agadez, May 2016.
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from the crisis appear as two moments in a single and same reconfigura-
tion sequence of the regional political economy. 
Foreign mediationS
We have seen that foreign interference in Sahelian affairs could be 
sources of turning to violent action. These interferences explain, to a large 
extent, why these states are at the same time essential mediators of the 
crises in Mali and Niger via their respective patronage networks within the 
rebel groups and by their means of pressure (border closure, crackdown 
of trafficking, blockade of supplies, etc.)  All the rebellions were put down 
through the intervention of regional mediators, sometimes combined 
(generally without consultation) with inter-community mediation at a local 
level as we will see later. Although, these regional mediations are officially 
intended to bring together the leaders of the main armed groups around 
the peace accord, they also have the hidden agenda of satisfying the inte-
rests of these interested mediators. Controlling the peace processes of 
these rebellions is a means of controlling the geopolitical dynamics in their 
south. 
Algeria has always been anxious to prevent the Tuareg rebellions in Mali, 
as well as in Niger from spilling over into its territory and not spreading 
to their own Tuareg communities. Therefore, it has fluctuated between a 
repressive position with regard to the 1963 rebellion (border closure and 
right of pursuit in favour of the Malian army), to a joint political affiliation 
fund with the Malian socialist government (BOILLEY, 2011), and a posi-
tion of biased mediator which supports a rebel figure favourable to it. As 
we have said previously, the 1990, 2006, and 2012 rebellions were all put 
down by the Algerian government by relying on Iyad Ag Ghaly on each 
occasion (BOUKHARS, 2012), but also some influential Ifoghas leaders in 
the armed movements. For Algeria, controlling the political and security 
dynamics in Kidal, and therefore relying on its leaders, is a condition for 
stability in its south. 
The Libyan intervention in the Sahelian rebellions more broadly reflects 
the will of the former Libyan leader to spread its influence in its south, in 
western Africa (PELLERIN, 2012). As for the Sahel, it has made CENSAD 
(Community of Sahel-Saharan States) the preferred instrument of its diplo-
macy in Mali and Niger (VALLEE, 2012), not hesitating to interfere in Malian 
issues in open competition with Algeria. We have discussed the hypothesis 
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that this rivalry may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2006 rebel-
lion. However, there is no doubt that Algeria and Libya fuelled a rivalry 
until the end of this rebellion, with Algeria officially managing a peace pro-
cess that Libya concluded by offering Ibrahim Ag Bahanga a golden exile. 
Similarly, during the 2007 MNJ rebellion, Algeria and Libya competed in 
their willingness to co-opt the rebellion leaders (BOILLEY, 2011), Algeria 
by indirectly supporting some networks and Libya by taking control of the 
financial burden of reintegrating the MNJ fighters, via Aghaly Alambo in 
particular, who also found refuge in Libya in 2008. The former leader’s 
actions were a perfect complement to the UN reintegration programme 
PPCAA (Programme of Peace Consolidation in the Aïr and the Azawak), in 
order to convince the least inclined to join this programme in exchange for 
hard cash, (DEYCARD, GUICHAOUA, 2011).
Consequently, these Algerian and Libyan interventions, although they 
have the merit of effectively putting the rebellions down, are in many 
respects destabilising. Based on elitist co-optations, these forced-march 
strategies have serious consequences on internal dynamics, sharpening 
inter-community rivalries in Mali. In Niger also, they have caused ten-
sions between groups, and the allocation of the peace dividends paid by 
Gaddafi gave rise to many conflicts surrounding Aghaly Alambo110. Above 
all, because these mediations are only intended to satisfy their geopoliti-
cal interests, namely the stability of their borders. Algeria and Libya are 
tending to reduce their involvement in managing the longer and more 
sensitive phase of the peace process: peace building. This sequence has 
therefore often remained without backing, as shown by the 2006 rebel-
lion, which was completed by the Kidal Forum in April 2007, which was 
highly criticised for its lack of preparation111. Similarly, the peace achieved 
in exchange for hard cash in Niger in 2009 was never ratified by a formal 
process or any official accord. In addition, both states favour support for 
their satellite(s) to the detriment of the peace process as such. Algeria’s 
position currently, sponsoring a peace process which is partly blocked by 
Iyad Ag Ghaly, who would however benefit from Algerian protections, is 
enlightening in this respect. 
In the sphere of mediation, the international community plays an 
important role, not without interference as well. On the one hand, the 
110. Interview with a former lieutenant of Aghaly Alambo, Niamey, May 2016. 
111. Interview with a prominent Tuareg, Bamako, May 2016. 
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international community is far from being as homogeneous as its name 
suggests and even though the Sahel is not the subject of open and stated 
rivalries between “western partners”, the latter can support different 
approaches112 in the Sahel. Even within some states, including France, in 
the context of the last rebellion in Mali, different departments may be 
driven by interests that do not or scarcely converge. During the 2000s, 
the open support of the President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
for President Amadou Toumani Touré, forced a form of self-censorship 
about the drift that the country was taking many on civil servants at the 
Embassy and the Foreign Ministry113. During the last rebellion in Mali, the 
interests of French diplomacy did not always follow those of the French 
army or intelligence services114. These systemic interferences, which fall 
under sociology of organisations, are likely to paralyse and/or complexify 
the process of recovering from the crisis. 
The international community assumes a leading role in terms of peace-
building. The financial resources that they mobilise at donor conferences 
largely determine what will happen to the (very costly) peacebuilding, 
since the Sahelian states are generally destitute to take on this task. 
Beyond the volumes committed, it is how they are committed, which 
shapes how peace will be built. The donors here play very different roles, 
between institutions like the World Bank which only wishes to deal with 
central governments (with the risk that the intended beneficiaries do not 
receive the money or not in full)115, and other donors, generally bilateral 
(like Switzerland or regional authorities) which deal with (and lend to) the 
local authorities. In this latter case, the redistribution channels (through 
tender markets for example) manage to reach down to the beneficiaries 
more easily, thus contributing to social peace. 
112. The use of armed action to end the armed conflict in 2013 was the subject of 
intense debate among European states throughout 2012. Interview with a French 
diplomat, Paris, September 2012.
113. Interview with several French diplomats and senior officials in Paris and Ba-
mako, 2013-2016.
114. Ibid.
115. Under its statutes, the World Bank only deals with states. 
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Peace From the bottom, community meaSureS being dePleted
The regional mediation processes are not sufficient to control all of the 
(generally inter-community) micro-conflicts that the peace accords volun-
tarily ignore to seek a consensus around the lowest common denomina-
tor116. Both levels of mediation are therefore most complementary.
Niger has not had to experiment with these local settlement methods, 
with the exception of the meeting in Tahoua organised in 1997 to endorse 
the reconciliation between the Tuareg and Arab populations117. North 
Mali, which has been heavily affected by local inter-community clashes 
since 1994, empirically developed these local settlement methods. The 
Bourem meeting, initiated in November 1994, which restored dialogue 
between the Songhai and Tuareg then at war, gave rise to a series of local 
meetings which were the source of most of the inter-community settle-
ments related to the rebellion in the region. The Bourem meeting, far from 
being limited to just the traditional chieftainships (who certainly were res-
ponsible for respecting the application of the Bourem accord), involved 
livestock herders, prominent government figures, and officials from the 
Ganda Koy (GREMONT, MARTY, MOSSA, HAMARA TOURE, 2004, p71). 
The last Malian rebellions also experienced such a process concluded by 
the Anefif Accord in October 2015. This last process is typical of this web 
between the regional, national, and local levels where tribes, remnants of 
armed groups, meet together with the Malian state (but without its parti-
cipation) to endorse an ad hoc peace process to the accord officially signed 
at Algiers four months earlier. Although it has not put an end to the dyna-
mics of conflict in northern Mali, it has undeniably helped to ease tensions 
between some key actors in the process. 
These local areas of dialogue and mediation are intended to put local 
actors, who do not have or no longer have a say, particularly the traditio-
nal chieftainships, at the centre of decision-making. In the past, the latter 
were able to resolve local conflicts. The conflict resolution between the 
Arabs and Kountas in 1999 was achieved by mobilising a commission of 
marabouts who reached a conclusion based on sharia118. Similarly, in 2006, 
116. Interview with a European Union official involved in negotiating the Algiers 
Accords, Brussels, June 2015. 
117. Interview with a former Nigerien rebel chief, Niamey, May 2016. 
118. Interview with a Lamhar community official who took part in the commis-
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intra-Idnan tensions were resolved by the different heads of the tribe’s 
groups119. Within the tribes relatively removed from armed conflicts, such 
as the Kel Ansar, the Ouillimiden or the Kel Essouks, the traditional and 
religious leaders continue to play a role in terms of conflict resolution120.
However, their role is gradually disintegrating under the effect of two 
dynamics: the progressive delegitimation of tribal leaders accused of being 
in the pay of the Malian government (AG YOUSSOUF, BOUHLEL, MARTY, 
SWIFT, 2012); the erosion of the power of these leaders in favour of the 
armed groups, often forcing them to remain on the sidelines or align with 
them without having effective power121. Consequently, the local conflicts 
are nowadays mainly resolved between the leaders of the armed groups, 
as the traditional leaders are too often reduced to bit players, with the 
exception of a few tribes. Again, the Anefif process is typical of this primacy 
of the armed groups in the sense that the meeting brought together the 
unofficial decision-makers of the rebellion: leaders of armed groups, drug 
traffickers and intermediaries for the jihadist groups. It shows the change 
in drivers of the rebellion and therefore the actors who make decisions. 
The study of the aforesaid community conflict between the Fulani and the 
Dawsahak also highlights these changes. All forms of vested issues (lives-
tock theft mafia, jihadist groups, rebel groups) have been built around a 
conflict originally related to the control of natural resources which broadly 
neutralise the capacity of the group and tribal leaders of the respective 
communities to move towards peace122.
Placing the onus of the local mediation processes on traditional lea-
ders who have been doubly weakened – on the one hand by the state 
since Moussa Traoré, and then by these new armed elites – is therefore 
completely unrealistic. The disintegration of the traditional system in Mali 
considerably stretches the local levels of conflict resolution, while they 
sion, Bamako, May 2016.
119. The Idnan tribe is a tribe in the Kel Adagh confederation. It is divided in 
groups torn by rivalries, particularly the Talkast and the Taitoq. Interview with a 
prominent Tuareg, Bamako, May 2016. Interview with a prominent Tuareg, Bama-
ko, May 2016.
120. Interview with the head of the Mbera camp, Bamako, May 2016.
121. Ibid.
122. Interview with an official from a mediation organisation, Bamako, February 
2016.
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continue to operate in Niger. Indeed, the Traditional Leaders’ Association 
in Niger is an influential intermediary, enabling the HACP to rely immedia-
tely on the leaders of townships and districts to act with the communities, 
although the latter are criticised for being agents of the authorities123. In 
Mali, although urban areas still see district leaders acting as mediators and 
intermediaries for the local authorities124, the rural areas are largely devoid 
of any form of intermediation with the state. 
Among local actors, the religious figures still seem to enjoy a certain 
social and community legitimacy, particularly the important marabout 
families which retain a regulatory role in some regions. The case of the 
religious Kane Diallo family in the Diré (Timbuktu) region is worthy of men-
tion125. A religious dynasty which has been able to retain its influence due 
to trade, the Kounta qadi in the area supported state justice, so that social 
peace has still been preserved. The existence of this informal network of 
important families in Mali could thus help to restore traditional mecha-
nisms for effective conflict management. The Algiers Accords, which allow 
for an enhanced role for the qadis in Mali, are moving in this direction, as 
Islamic justice can be an effective instrument for controlling tensions. 
This section reviews the many tools that the Sahelian states are enlisting 
in concrete terms to make peace. These tools are activated officially or not 
and are violent or non-violent. Their complexification, in the form of inter-
nationalisation or openness to private economic interests is a reflection of 
the complexification of the rebellions seen in section 3. This analysis could 
be developed in at least two directions. Firstly, the interdependencies of 
these various tools could be studied more systematically. Are they com-
peting or complementary? Complementarities are probably practical and 
desirable. An example is that of a well programme financed by an interna-
tional NGO in Niger (i.e. a development intervention), supported by more 
political consultation work with town councillors and young people locally, 
conducted more or less formally by the HACP126. It is the combination of 
123. This is because they come under the Ministry of Interior which compensates 
them officially. 
124. Interview with district leaders in Bamako, Bamako, June 2016. 
125. Interview with a former prosecutor in Timbuktu, Bamako, June 2016.
126. The French Development Agency’s Crises and Conflicts Unit is entirely based 
on this logic of complementarity of development actions and promotion of peace. 
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the two actions which produces the desired stabilisation, as the develop-
ment project alone could revive local competition for access to resources. 
Another configuration of inter-community conflicts suggests the least 
possible involvement of the state and calls for a very broad local and 
endogenous resolution scale. The history of Mali since 1990 argues for 
this. The only sequence of calm experienced by Mali was between 1996 
and 2006. During this period, the (relative) peace in northern Mali was 
due to the benefits of the Bourem process and the prevailing understan-
ding between the communities. The few localised conflicts (such as that 
between the Kountas and the Arabs) were settled locally by local actors 
without interference from the Malian government. The 2006 rebellion 
occurred precisely as a result of this interference which resulted in the 
valuing of one community (the Imghads) at the expense of the other (the 
Ifoghas), this pattern has not been fundamentally modified since then. 
This policy of community preference has even worsened in order to put 
down the 2006 rebellion through the creation of Arab and Imghad militias. 
The other obvious question which would deserve further development 
is the timing of the various actions: when do you choose the armed res-
ponse rather than the outstretched hand, selective co-optation or decay? 
The specific characteristics of rebellions, including the extent of their social 
base informs the state’s choices. However, the actors’ perceptions about 
the intentions or the military capacity of the other parties in the conflict 
also come into play here. It is the role of mediators to develop these per-
ceptions in the least unfavourable directions possible. This process is only 
effective provided that the mediations are not competing among themsel-
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v - concluSion: the determinantS For Peace in the 
Sahel 
 
This section, which is intended to be conclusive and practical, resumes 
the main conclusions of our study in terms of peacebuilding in the Sahel. 
In terms of the complexity of the processes at work, the fact that sove-
reign interests are at stake which it is very difficult to influence, and finally 
given the fact that many grey areas continue to surround the logics of 
rebel engagement and disengagement in the Sahel, our approach is reso-
lutely modest. It consists in highlighting the difficulties and sticking points 
in peacebuilding, and in designing solutions to circumvent them, without 
claiming any form of absolute truth. 
The peacebuilding processes often involve different timings, which we 
have highlighted in this report: very short timing for the international com-
munity (interested in the formal signing of the peace accord, synonymous 
with diplomatic victory)127 ; short or medium for the states (motivated 
by electoral deadlines and the attraction that the international revenue 
from peace represents); and long for the stakeholders directly involved 
in the conflict. This co-existence of different timings leads to compromises 
which are at the heart of the negotiating process and which certainly allow 
for a formal and often snatched signing of an accord. This is done at the 
risk of leaving aside latent centres of conflict, which will interfere very 
negatively in the standardised mechanics of the peacebuilding process. 
Consequently, the appropriation of the peacebuilding timetables by 
national and local actors seems important. It is not a question here of 
making the local level the miracle-solution of peace, but of considering 
that this clash of timing seems to be at the expense of peace, understood 
here not as the cessation of hostilities, but as the “positive peace” dear to 
Galtung. Time is not necessarily the enemy of the recovery of the crisis, 
especially in a context like that of the Sahel where the fluidity between war 
127. In the context of the Malian crisis in 2012, the different parties which made 
up the international community repeatedly demonstrated their eagerness for the 
“recovery from the crisis”: pressure from France to hold elections in 2013, pres-
sure for the signature of the Algiers Accord, and pressure for the strict observance 
of the Accord’s timetable.
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and peace is constant and the natural order of things is an intermediate 
state of “neither war nor peace.” 
a remedy For each context 
It appears from our study that the main remedies for recoveries from 
rebellion have always been the same until now in Mali and in Niger: decen-
tralisation, reintegration (civil and military) and development projects. On 
the surface, although the results may a priori be comparable between the 
two countries, their capacity to translate into peace actually varies greatly 
from one country to the other. Although the same remedies do not pro-
duce the same results, four hypotheses are used here to explain this diffe-
rence: 
- The implementation modalities differ from one state to another. To 
respond to this first hypothesis with confidence would require the study of 
the implementation modalities of measures, considered individually and 
adopted from the end of the 1990 rebellions. By implementation moda-
lities, we mean how these methods have been implemented: by whom? 
For whose benefit?  At what moment?  With what follow-up? This study, 
which would be a huge doctoral degree, would no doubt make it possible 
to glimpse the significant differences between the two states. No study 
up to now has investigated how projects have been implemented and the 
money disbursed. Such an undertaking would undeniably highlight some 
limitations and counter-productive measures, as will be discussed in the 
following point. 
As a minimum, we can say that the lack of organisations similar to the 
HACP deprives Mali of an institution with the ability to monitor projects 
undertaken over time (the HACP now even has a monitoring-evaluation 
framework managed by the European Union) and therefore how these 
are conducted. The existing organisations in Mali have always experienced 
serious governance problems which raise doubt about the effectiveness 
of the measures implemented. The General Auditor’s Office sounds the 
alarm each year about the scale of corruption, writing for example in 2011 
that, “the state is simply stripped and robbed” (ICG, 2014). The ANICT 
(National Investment Agency for Local Authorities) organisation, which a 
large part of the funds for northern Mali pass through, does not escape 
accusations of misappropriation confirmed by an audit of ANICT, financed 
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at the request of the European Union128. It would therefore be necessary 
to dwell precisely on the amounts disbursed and the projects undertaken 
(with a very low implementation rate129) in order to know if the target 
populations were actually the beneficiaries. The recent French Senate 
report does not say anything else: “Given the cronyism networks built up 
by the Malian government in the northern municipalities, the choice of 
projects, partners, or implementing agencies was influenced by fraudulent 
deals between political entities and private enterprises, sometimes at the 
expense of the population” (SENAT, 2016). The Senate here indirectly points 
to the international community’s (passive) responsibility which distributes 
its aid without carefully observing the use made of it. This observation is 
far from new, the diversion of humanitarian aid intended for northern Mali 
was particularly documented in Moussa Traoré’s time and played a role 
in the outbreak of the 1990 rebellion. The same causes130, with the same 
actors, producing the same effects; the effects of implementing the 2015 
Algiers Accord should be questioned. Symbolically, it can be noted that 
the demonstrations held in 2011 in Timbuktu to oppose the allocation of 
public contracts to “non-Timbuktians” as part of the implementation of 
the PSPSDN broke out again in 2015 after the signing of the Algiers Accord. 
These problems in implementing projects which do not benefit the tar-
get population, feed the ideological resources of the armed groups which 
then find a way to extend their militant base, as much as they serve the 
cause of actors in the grey economy and the jihadist groups which can 
boast of “feeding” their entourage for the former and banishing all forms 
of corruption for the latter. 
- Low societal integration between north and south will have a nega-
tive influence on the implementation of the accord. This second hypothe-
sis has mainly been confirmed by this study. Integration must be societal, 
before being political. We have already highlighted the greater social inte-
gration in northern Niger compared to northern Mali, which produces 
social, economic or political interactions. There are the objective factors 
128. Interview with a European Union official, Bamako, July 2015. 
129. Interview with an expert from the World Bank, Bamako, June 2015.
130. In 2014, Mali’s partners suspended their financial support for the state fol-
lowing the discovery of over-invoicing on private contracts: purchase of a presi-
dential Boeing for 26 million euros and signature of defence contracts for € 105 
million.
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of community rapprochement and interdependence, and at the same 
time, the dilution of tribal identities. These identities still find expression 
in Niger, but more inclusively. Yet, societal integration cannot be asserted 
through a peace accord and can only be effective in the long term. 
Recognising this structural reality is not saying that it cannot be modi-
fied by the corrective measures. This observation should inspire more 
ingenuity on the part of the peacemakers in Mali, so that the development 
chapter is not limited to a few basic social services intended to re-establish 
a semblance of relations between the authorities and citizens, or even to 
some infrastructure thought up in isolation in its regional environment 
without an integration plan in the Saharan area. Serious thought should 
be given to this integration of the Malian north with its south, rather than 
with its north, namely Algeria, so that this economic and therefore societal 
integration benefits the country politically. 
Creating relationships of trust within Malian society is also a prerequi-
site to societal integration. The term creation is deliberately chosen at the 
expense of that of restoration, as this is the case for Mali, as we have seen, 
there has never been trust since Mali’s independence. This creation seems 
to go through a national reconciliation, which has never been completed 
since 1990, with the historical legacy of 1963 continuing to weigh on the 
consciousness in northern Mali and being sustained by the atrocities com-
mitted by the Malian army. There again, the question of the clash of timing 
may also be raised, knowing that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission was set up in Mali, while the stakeholders were still fighting 
in the north of the country. This reconciliation seems to be a prerequisite 
– admittedly not enough on its own – so that, for example, any appoint-
ment or integration of a Tuareg within the Malian state institutions is not 
perceived as downward social mobility. This duty of memory can also be 
realised outside the formal framework of this Commission. Let us think 
here about writing a shared history of Mali which is the joint work of intel-
lectuals in the north and the south. 
- The socio-political configurations which prevail when signing an 
accord will largely determine the conditions for its implementation. 
It emerges from this study that the complexity of the northern Malian 
theatre reduces the effectiveness of certain measures adopted under 
peacebuilding or even makes them counter-productive. This is the case, 
for example, of the civil integration phase which seems to have little or 
no effect in Mali. Political appointments (advisor, minister, etc.) or insti-
tutional (Northern Mali Development Agency for example) which follow 
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a sequence of rebellion are far from focusing on individuals who are the 
subject of a consensus within the Tuareg community. During the two terms 
of ATT for example, the Imghad were appointed at the head of the main 
institutions created under peacebuilding, which continually fuelled the risk 
that the Ifoghas would use violence to control a political process which 
was to their disadvantage. These integrations, as we have determined in 
this report, are not limited to the allocation of a monthly revenue, but 
are associated with positions of power which are used by their holders 
to benefit their community. This automatically functions as an integrating 
tool when the person is not accused of bias within this community, like 
Brigi Rafini in Niger. However, this may on the contrary act as a foil when 
the person belongs to a clan and they strengthen their clan at the expense 
of rival clans in the community or other communities. This is broadly what 
happened in Mali, on the hand through supporting the Imghads at the 
expense of the Ifoghas, and then through supporting the Arabs at the 
expense of many Tuareg tribes, provoking a rebellion on a wide social scale 
like in 2012. 
The observation is the same for decentralisation. Although the results 
are rather encouraging in Niger despite significant challenges still to be 
met, they are subject to debate in Mali as discussed in section IV. It should 
also be added that the current phase (embryonic) of implementing regio-
nalisation in Mali raises more problems than solutions: profiteering on 
the creation of new territorial entities in the same way as Menaka and 
Taoudeni; aggravated community rivalries in the run-up to regional elec-
tions which promise to be the scene of unresolved conflicts against the 
background of the last rebellion131. This fact supports the argument that 
Mali, partly under pressure from the international community, is advancing 
dangerously in terms of peacebuilding without guaranteeing the basics for 
its proper implementation. The organisation of the general assemblies 
for decentralisation in November 2013, while no peace accord had been 
reached with the armed groups, illustrates this excessive eagerness (ICG, 
2014).
- Foreign interference neutralises the beneficial effects of peace reme-
dies. This hypothesis was also broadly confirmed at the end of our study. 
131. This worry is shared by the ICG, which considers in Mali that, “decentrali-
sation sometimes generates a radicalisation of community demands and violent 
tensions around territorial divisions.” 
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The foreign interference – namely Libyan geopolitics (which France and 
NATO have a major responsibility in), the implantation of jihadist groups 
and the exponential development of the grey economy – have been 
direct factors in the outbreak and spreading of the 2012 rebellion in Mali. 
Although catalytic events of an ideological nature were many and effec-
tively paved the way for the rebellion, these three elements have given it 
an unprecedented scale. Especially, the last two forms of foreign interfe-
rence maintain the rebellion, by giving its actors unparalleled financial and 
military resources in the history of rebellions in the Sahel. 
Behind three of the four hypotheses, is the state’s responsibility 
which is directly and heavily involved. The implementation modali-
ties of the peace accords to a large extent come under its sovereignty, 
although as we have said, the international community may play an ancil-
lary role. The socio-political configuration is also largely of its own making 
because, as we have repeatedly highlighted in this report, the state has 
continuously aggravated inter-community tensions to the point of them 
becoming a form of governance, making the context less and less mana-
geable. Finally, this foreign interference is those which the state has the 
least control. Over. The Libyan factor is obviously completely foreign (and 
the Malian state objectively multiplied efforts to negotiate the disarma-
ment of Tuaregs returned from Libya), but the development of AQMI and 
the grey economy, as we have seen, was largely facilitated by the Malian 
state. The Malian state’s direct responsibility should also be emphasised in 
the delays experienced with the decentralisation process. Political support 
for this issue at the highest level of state has proved essential to overcome 
the inertia (known and recognised in Mali) of the Malian central govern-
ment, structurally resistant to decentralisation which is perceived as relin-
quishing its prerogatives. 
The alleged responsibility of the Malian state in the country’s situation 
may appear paradoxically reassuring. It re-establishes the objective causes 
to a situation that can appear hopeless. However, the solutions which 
could have been adapted before 2012, are no longer so today in view of 
the unprecedented crisis facing the country. Unfortunately, there does not 
seem to be miracle solutions, as the determinants of current dynamics 
seem to escape the state which no longer has control over the whole of 
northern Mali and less and less over its centre.
The responses, which will take time, are based above all on a reasser-
tion of the Malian state’s stamp, not like that made in 2011 through the 
relocation of barracks in northern Mali, but by a positive representation of 
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this state: soldiers who focus their interventions on civilian-military rather 
than counter-terrorism (lack of atrocities, which unfortunately are still too 
recurrent); more efficient administrative services focused on the provision 
of basic services; the reinstatement of fair justice and tools for appeasing 
inter-individual or community differences. It is only through these stages 
that the state will be able to rebuild trust with the populations and thus 
nibble away at the legitimacy enjoyed by the jihadist groups and the actors 
in the grey economy. 
However, these measures cannot be adopted in a conventional 
framework by state officials, in the current situation in northern and cen-
tral Mali. They must and can only rely on local actors that are first and fore-
most group leaders, marabouts, and qadis. Their mobilisation, as informal 
intermediaries for the state, would make it possible to reinforce their 
capacity and make them actors for preventing crises and conflicts (BOWD, 
CHIKWANHA, 2010).
Overcoming “track one” therefore does not necessarily weaken 
the state by delegating its power to others, but bringing the sources of 
sub-statal authority into line with it. Neither Niger or Mali have achieved 
this objective (although they have assigned it), but Niger however has 
elite intermediaries to do it: through the Traditional Leaders’ Association; 
through the very extensive network of the PNDS; through informal (inter-
marriages) or formal (HACP) interconnections. These elite intermediaries 
make it possible to more or less discreetly and subtly approach the deci-
sion-makers and their “base” contributing to the “rise” in demands from 
the periphery to the centre all the more easily. 
unravelling the Web oF intereStS in the Sahel and aligning the Prota-
goniStS’ PoSitionS 
We have highlighted in this study the institutional tangles which 
contribute to peacebuilding. These tangles operate vertically 
(between the regional and local peace processes) and horizontally 
(between the official activity of the process and the informal dis-
cussion which take place behind the scenes), between the interests, 
ideological (which conceal clan or tribal sub-motives) as well as 
exogenous (grey economy and jihadist groups). The settlement of 
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these various entanglements is the key to peace in the Sahel if the 
aforesaid settlement is lasting and fair.
Durability is based first and foremost on a permanent institu-
tional architecture, so that the peacebuilding process withstands 
changes in the political regime. In Mali, as we have seen, since 
the establishment of the Northern Commission in 1992 under the 
National Pact, there has been no continuity, the ADIN (Authority 
for the Integrated Development of Northern Mali), and then the ADN, 
were created as a replacement for the Commission and entrusted 
to members of the Imghad community. Its original meaning was 
therefore largely distorted, even to the point of becoming the sub-
ject of protests on the part of the rival tribes and more specifically 
the Ifoghas, with the ADN becoming the symbol of an unfair peace 
consolidation process. Conversely, we have discussed the continuity 
of the HACP in Niger, which has spanned the regimes in its current 
form without being reworked too much, while steering clear of the 
issues of tribal rivalries. 
Durability therefore very largely depends on fairness, which is based 
on taking into account all the interests, without one party appearing too 
favoured at the expense of another. Yet, it is in direct contradiction with 
most of the peacemaking strategies favoured up to now, and particularly, 
the division and community instrumentalisation strategies which create a 
distortion, automatically causing frustrations that could turn into armed 
conflict in the short, medium, or long term. This fairness is even under-
mined, as we have said, by the highly interested involvement of regional 
powers, playing the role of mediator, particularly Algeria. Since the latter 
has managed to enforce and assert its interests, it is for other international 
and national mediators to re-establish a form of fairness by ensuring that 
the mediation does not harm one or more parties.
Analysis of the failures of the peace processes in Mali only shows 
too well the gaps in non-inclusive institutional arrangements, where 
the exclusion of one or more parties sows the seeds of a future crisis in a 
context where opportunities for triggering violent actions are extremely 
widespread: distribution of arms, interfering regional powers, etc. 
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One of the concerns raised is the lack of transparency in negotiating 
these arrangements. The analysis of conflicts in the Sahel constantly pits 
stated interests and hidden interests. Between the lines, the part played by 
drug-trafficking interests is raised – determinants but constantly obscured 
–, the role of regional powers – for whom the north of Mali and Niger 
forms a buffer zone, and the interests of western powers – within which 
there may be discordant activities between the different departments. 
This transparency is a guarantee of the fairness of the arrangement. Even 
then, the support of a party for the peace process can conceal hidden inte-
rests which, once displayed or defended, threaten the structure again. 
However, this transparency is not favoured by the fact that the driving 
factors of rebellions are immediately excluded from the rules of the game 
set out by the mediators, like again, the grey economy and especially the 
jihadist groups. For example, let us take the case of the HCUA in the 2012 
rebellion in Mali. Its formal support for the peace process was negotiated 
on the basis of official demands which are only partially representative 
of its actual demands. It should be remembered from the outset that the 
HCUA is a remnant of Ansar Dine, yet this organisation militated for the 
unity of Mali and not for any form of autonomy as the HCUA does nowa-
days. Moreover, it can legitimately be assumed that the HCUA maintains 
close and coerced relations with Ansar Dine whose classification as a ter-
rorist group excluded it at the outset from the peace process and makes it 
de facto infeasible. Such a configuration makes the peace process not very 
clear and therefore requires the mobilisation of informal communication 
channels which circumvent the systemic limitations. 
In short, unravelling the web of Sahelian interests requires a dynamic 
approach to the relationships between the actors in the crisis. In other 
terms, it is not enough simply for a peacebuilding approach to be identi-
fied and included in the actors’ processes by imagining that each one has 
an established legitimacy that it would be sufficient to recognise in order 
to achieve peace. The challenge is also to understand the interdependen-
cies between these actors and the compatibility of their agendas and to 
work to harmonise them. 
“The inclusion” celebrated in literature as well as the objectives are 
too often synonymous with an invitation to share the cake of the “political 
market” (DE WAAL, 2016)132 between the many guests. Yet, the expansion 
132. In this market, de Waal asserts, “violence is a means of bargaining and sig-
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of the monetisation of peace only whets the appetites and the resent-
ments. The inclusion without a long-term vision is limited in scope: inte-
grations in the army without a plan for the promotion or recruitment of 
future generations; community-based targeting of aid (such as the Tubus 
as part of the Community Cohesion Initiative in Niger, funded by USAID, 
and designated as beneficiaries on the basis of obscure criteria). 
Foreign diPlomatic interFerence and national Sovereignty 
One of the differences we have seen between Niger and Mali is that 
the former state has also managed to retain control of its peace process, 
precisely due to the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, which 
nowadays is essential for each donor wishing to intervene in Niger in the 
area of peace. Besides, the fact that Niger managed to retain the attributes 
of a sovereign state during the 2000s unlike Mali (whose collusive relations 
with AQMI we have mentioned) protects it somewhat from foreign diplo-
matic interference. 
A look at the fragmentation of the peace process in Mali, suggests 
that these multiple diplomatic interferences make achieving peace more 
complex. The goal here is not to rigorously measure the impact of these 
initiatives, which would probably be an insurmountable methodological 
challenge. In the light of our study, at least two findings stand out. On the 
one hand, these often un-coordinated initiatives dilute and fragment the 
governance of crises; on the other hand, they endogenously create condi-
tions for their continuation: conferences, travel abroad, generous budgets 
allocated to “community meetings”, etc. form a comfortable political eco-
nomy for its agents and an emollient, or even numbing one, for conflict 
resolution.
Indeed, the jungle of peace initiatives very often produces coun-
ter-productive effects. At a regional level, the competition between the 
mediating states maintains the rebellion more than resolves it, as we have 
seen between Algeria and Burkina Faso (officially), but also with Morocco, 
Niger and Mauritania in the mediation of the last Malian crisis. Each state 
undertakes its mediation with brokers representing well-defined vested 
interests within the rebellion, resulting in each state defending its compo-
nent more than the dialogue itself. Maintaining each of these sub-groups 
nalling value” (p. 18).
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does not encourage them to move towards peace. Quite often, the media-
tion organisations become – deliberately or not – complicit in these dis-
parate initiatives by endorsing one or other of the mediations, or even 
undertaking non-governmental ad hoc processes. Although some of these 
initiatives may be successful (when they perfectly complement the peace 
process at work), others are counter-productive. When Niger summoned 
all of the tribal and group leaders together in northern Mali on its terri-
tory for a reconciliation meeting in 2014, some representatives from the 
rebel groups left before the end at the invitation of one of these mediation 
organisations in Europe133. This example illustrates the often unexpected 
capacity of these organisations to torpedo the processes at work. Similarly, 
more recently, another smaller organisation tried to negotiate an ad hoc 
accord to the Algiers Accord on the sly (without the official endorsement 
of the Malian authorities). This attempt, which ended in failure, seems to 
have revived some tensions. This confusion is made possible: on the one 
hand, by the fairly understandable appetite of the actors (state as well as 
rebels) for the daily allowances, the official travel and other associated 
material advantages, as well as the symbolic capital offered; on the other 
hand, because of the Malian state’s lack of authority to clarify and arrange 
legitimate actors to intervene in the peace process. 
The increase in these mediation channels produces a double effect 
which is particularly detrimental to the peace process. On the one hand, 
it dilutes the hierarchical structures within the armed groups and therefore 
produces new leaders, who are supported materially and in the media by 
the organisations which sponsor them. This clearly makes the dialogue and 
achievement of peace more complex. On the other hand, this fragmented 
process has the effect of diluting national sovereignty. The supranational 
processes sometimes place states in politically untenable positions, like 
in Mali in the 2012 crisis where the state endorsed a peace accord which 
was subject of very little, if any, ownership by Malian civil society and poli-
tics. The legitimacy of the Malian state is fairly weakened and the image 
reflected by the state in public opinion is that of a weak, absent state, even 
under international tutelage. The establishment of an organisation similar 
to the HACP in Niger, which would lead at the highest level continuously 
and by centralising all the peace initiatives undertaken, would improve the 
consistency of the overall system and would reinforce the state’s mark. It 
133. Interview with the organiser of this meeting in Niger, electronic exchange, 
May 2014.
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remains to be seen whether Mali is capable of enforcing such an institution 
on the myriad of actors operating in the country. 
The last form of interference in national sovereignty is counter-terro-
rism, for the time being under international tutelage (mainly French and 
American, but also to a lesser extent Chadian), pending the Malian armed 
forces (and to a lesser extent the Nigerien) being able to assume this role. 
The idea here is not to discuss the merit of counter-terrorism operations, 
but to highlight the paralysing effect of them on the peace that they should 
be alleviating. Counter-terrorism is a dimension of conflict management, 
recently introduced to the Sahel and overseen internationally. It has the 
effect of breaking up the chain of legitimate protagonists of war and peace 
by foreign imposition, under the performative effect of “terrorist” catego-
risation, the consequence of which is “we do not talk to terrorists.” 
This poses a certain number of practical difficulties in the peace process. 
As the “terrorist” categorisation is considered beyond redemption (since it 
is results in inclusion on the list of terrorist groups), it deprives the actors in 
this category of any form of return/reintegration. Yet, we have specifically 
seen in the Sahelian context that many jihadists are very opportune and 
without even any ideological veneer. Placement in this category risks, on 
the contrary, reinforcing them in their initial choice, and over time, increa-
sing the share of ideology in group membership, as many testimonies 
gathered – at Diffa regarding Boko Haram and in Mali regarding the Fulani 
in the MUJAO – demonstrate. National authorities should be encouraged 
to some extent to reclaim control of the “terrorist” labelling in order to 
keep doors open for some elements in these groups seeking repentance 
and reintegration. 
Furthermore, the armed groups themselves use this categorisation in 
order to circumvent it better. The existing fluidity between certain armed 
groups who are signatories to the Algiers Accord and the terrorist groups 
is no secret from this point of view. Far from being limited to the HCUA 
as recently reported by France, these collusions affect all the signatory 
groups and for a good reason: terrorism is a constant which must be dealt 
with other than solely by counter-terrorism. Once this categorisation is 
endorsed and is imposed on the Malian state, it deprives the latter of mar-
gins for manoeuvre that it deems necessary to achieve peace. It is impos-
sible here not to mention the specific case of Iyad Ag Ghaly. While there is 
currently lobbying in favour of opening negotiations with the latter (lob-
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bying supported by HCUA)134, and messages are passed to the highest level 
of the Malian state through unofficial channels, the official message of the 
Malian state remains that set out by the President in his columns in Jeune 
Afrique in December 2015: “Negotiating with him is out of the question135.” 
It cannot be otherwise, as Iyad Ag Ghaly is a “high value target” and the 
French forces are tracking him in the Kidal region. The existence of active 
unofficial channels is a remedy to this paralysing situation. 
Finally, the risk that French mark on the Sahel paradoxically is fuel-
ling terrorism should be put forward, with the legal justification (from 
the Qu’ranic point of view) of jihad being greatly facilitated as resistance 
to an attack against Muslims in Islamic lands. Several imams (particularly 
one in Kayes and one in Mauritania) are known publicly to have supported 
jihad against France since 2013, but many other cases have been reported 
unofficially. Our intention is not to suggest that this Qu’ranic argument 
is justified in any way (and as proof of this, the High Islamic Council of 
Mali spoke out against the legality of jihad in 2012136), but simply relaying 
the effects caused by counter-terrorist operations objectively serves the 
jihadist groups’ cause, which feeds on the French military presence to 
denounce a colonialist revival in Islamic countries. This military presence 
cannot be long-term, otherwise it would justify its critics and feed the idea 
that it should be fought against. 
can niger Serve aS a role model? 
As part of this study, we have put forward Niger’s advantages in buil-
ding and consolidating peace: 
- a naturally more lenient legacy which promotes social, political and 
economic interactions between the north and south;
- progress in the implementation of peace accords, particularly with 
regard to integration in the army (with the Saharan Security Units) or 
decentralisation (with the implementation of regionalisation); 
134. Interview with Malian officials who had met a mission from HCUA in favour of 
opening up negotiations with Iyad Ag Ghaly, Bamako, May 2016.
135. Jeune Afrique.
136. Interview with an HCI official, Bamako, January 2016.
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- a lasting institutional architecture around the HACP which continues 
the work of peace consolidation beyond regime changes, at the same time 
spreading a positive image of the Nigerien state (“hearts and minds”) in 
the country’s vulnerable regions; 
- an extensive integration system which goes beyond the single scope 
of political appointments of former rebels to integrating them in Niger’s 
political economy;
- a sufficiently inclusive structure to muffle any desires for change 
expressed by public opinion in the north; 
- national sovereignty safeguarded (partly with the support of France, 
the United States, and now Chad in Diffa) within its territory, preventing 
the establishment of terrorist groups, which we have seen constitute a 
new mechanism for violent engagement; 
- a windfall effect generated by gold mining at Djado and especially at 
Tchintabarakaten. 
These advantages seem largely to be contributing to Niger’s stability, 
thus supporting the idea that the peace process is in the consolidation 
phase. However, the country is far from being a role model. In some res-
pects, Niger is similar to a house of cards. As long as no external element 
undermines it, the structure will hold due to its strengths that we have 
listed above. 
Firstly, in many ways, the key stages of peacebuilding have been ignored 
or have not been completed. As a minimum, no peace accord actually sets 
the state’s post-peace commitments (tacitly) with the MNJ. The national 
reconciliation process, like in Mali, has never been carried out even if 
the trauma of Tchintabaraden seems to have been overcome according 
to some Tuaregs we met. The task of collecting weapons continues, but 
with the idea that the same drivers of one part of economy in northern 
Niger (gold mining, smuggling, grey economy) require minimal weapons. 
Furthermore, there are many sources of cracking, and the Nigerien state 
is weak in its ability to solve them. This supports the idea that peace is 
never achieved and that violence remains an important instrument of the 
Sahelian political arena. 
The challenge for Niger is now to endorse the fact that political control 
between the north and south does not lie in violence, but through the 
103
Making Peace, Building the State
commitment of institutions such as the Regional Council, the National 
Assembly or the Prime Minister. While a large share of the former rebels 
has accepted this idea, their support is fragile and probably not final. The 
social pressure exerted on these former leaders, as well as the perma-
nence of a successful figure associated with the status of rebel could drive, 
or even constrain, some of them to join an emerging movement. Finally, 
let us not forget that hundreds of young fighters remain armed in Aïr, for 
the time being occupied in the grey economy or gold mining. 
Furthermore, Niger is not exempt from exogenous influences whether 
it be the cross-border grey economy137, geopolitical unrest from southern 
Libya138 or Algeria. This was already strongly felt in 2007 when the MNJ 
rebellion broke out, whose original motivations seemed to be far removed 
from the ideological repertoire, but which managed to extend its social 
and fighter base all the same. From this episode, it should be remembe-
red that there existed and still exists sub-categories of actors expressing 
a deep frustration which finds satisfaction in rebel engagement. These 
same reasons maintain a climate of latent tension in northern Niger that 
the HACP is constantly trying to calm down. Yet, these efforts depend to a 
large extent on the financial capabilities of state, whose current budgetary 
difficulties we have already discussed.
137. In August 2016, several traffickers were kidnapped in Niger, reflecting the 
rivalries which exist in this environment and which could result in the armed set-
tling of scores involving reports of rebellion against the state. 
138. In particular, a deterioration of the situation in southern Libya could trigger a 
wave of Nigeriens returning from southern Libya to northern Niger. 
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aPPendix
abbreviationS
ADC: May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change
ADIN: Authority for the Integrated Development of Northern Mali 
ADN: Northern Mali Development Agency
AQMI: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CRI: Collective for Renewal and Innovation 
DGDSE: General Directorate for Documentation and External Security
FFR: Front of the Forces of Recovery
FIAA: Arab Islamic Front of Azawad
FLAA: Aïr and Azawak Liberation Front
FNIS: National Intervention and Security Forces
FPLN: Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger
FPN: Niger Patriotic Front 
HACP: High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace 
MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mis-
sion in Mali
MNA: National Movement for Azawad
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MNJ: Niger Movement for Justice
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO: Movement for the Oneness of Jihad in West Africa 
OCDE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OCRS: Common Organisation of the Saharan Regions
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PNDS: Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism 
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